8 PREFACE. 



down, and the other constructed with the materials." Now, 

 this latter sense is the sense in which Mr Huxley, I, and every- 

 body else, for the most part, use the word; but whether Mr 

 Huxley, I, or anybody else use the word, the context will 

 always show if it be the rarer, primary, numerical sense that is 

 intended or not. Does Mr Huxley insinuate that I represent 

 him as arguing that the protoplasm of this monkey is numeri- 

 cally the same as the protoplasm of that man? I feel sure that 

 it is impossible for either of us to be so absurd. But if he does 

 not mean that, what can he mean by the ambiguity he flourishes, 

 and his reference to Archbishop Whately ? Whatever he means, 

 I take him at his word; I tell him that, when he holds all 

 living things to consist of the " same " protoplasm, " same " is 

 not to him the term as used in Whately's primary, but as used 

 in Whately's secondary sense ; I tell him also that as it is to 

 him, so it is to me. According to Whately, when we say, " this 

 house is built of the same stone with such another, we merely 

 mean that the stones are undistinguishable in their qualities :" 

 similarly Mr Huxley, when he said that all life was built of the 

 same protoplasm, meant it to be understood that the protoplasms 

 were " undistinguishable in their qualities ; " and using words 

 quite in his own sense it was that I denied. Ambiguity there 

 was none, and Archbishop Whately, Mr Huxley's own reference, 

 but proves my case. Consider one or two of Mr Huxley's own 

 phrases ! " There is such a thing as a physical basis or matter 

 of life ; " . . . . or " the physical basis or matter of life." 

 There is " a single physical basis of life," and through its unity 

 " the whole living world " is pervaded by " a three-fold unity " 

 " namely, a unity of power or faculty, a unity of form, and a 

 unity of substantial composition." With such expressions ring- 

 ing in our ears and they occur on every page which of us, Mr 

 Huxley or I, shall be said to be the one who rather pushes identity? 

 Omitting the deep logical question that lies at the bottom of 

 all, may I not say, then, that my whole argument is a completely 

 valid and scientific one, founded on scientific difference as 

 opposed to Mr Huxley's argument from scientific identity ? 

 And, in short, in attempting to stamp out all essential differ- 

 ences in the one non-existent identity of a vital matter, has not 

 Mr Huxley simply deluded himself? If I only hold up, then, 

 the difference he ignores to the identity he proclaims, that is much 

 more than the " ambiguity" of the word " same." 



