34 THE LESSON OF EVOLUTION 



could be shewn that the hypothesis of necessity 

 explained matters which the common-sense view could 

 not, then I might be inclined to believe in it. 

 But such is not the case ; and it seems to me that 

 what the metaphysicians have really done is to prove 

 that free-will in man could not possibly have arisen 

 through the action of physical causes. 1 Here, therefore, 

 we have another possible break in continuity. Life, 

 and perhaps free-will, could not have arisen from 

 antecedent conditions alone ; and so the idea of the 

 continuous action of secondary causes fails. 



When we try to follow the subject further we are 

 beset with innumerable difficulties arising from the 

 complicated nature of the problem. However, it seems 

 probable that the whole of biological evolution may 

 be due to the working of natural laws which we 

 already know, but the action of which we cannot trace 

 out in detail. Nevertheless we must remember that 

 we have as yet no theory of variation that fits all the 

 facts. At present variations appear to be as capricious 

 and unamenable to law as did the wind and rain to 

 our forefathers. And, until they are reduced to order 

 and we understand how and why they arise, we must 

 be careful not to push the doctrine of secondary causes 

 too far. Mr Herbert Spencer would account for every- 

 thing by what he calls " equilibration " ; but that is 



1 If mind is always present in living protoplasm, it may be that 

 it was originally free to act, but, being gradually influenced by former 

 experiences, its independent action was gradually lost among the 

 numerous impulses due to memory, and so it became almost entirely 

 instinctive. Volition, however, was only latent, and as the brain 

 developed, it began to reassert itself, until in man it was enabled 

 to burst the bonds of custom and became once more capable of 

 assuming the initiative. Thus free- will emerged as a potent factor in 

 evolution. 



