38 BEING AND FACULTIES OF MAN. 



of Consciousness, and are not senses in any meaning toy- 

 which sense or physical consciousness of the impressions 

 upon them is implied. Now a little attention to the 

 distinctive peculiarities of the five senses will make us 

 aware that, instead of any ground having ever existed for 

 Berkeley's theory of the non-demonstrability of matter, the 

 experience of the various senses is so distinguished and 

 arranged as to give us every kind of evidence necessary to 

 demonstrate the existence and all the externally obvious 

 and immediately appreciable peculiarities of matter. 

 Thus touch is necessary and able to perceive the actuality 

 of matter as well as whether it be soft or hard, and what 

 is its general temperature as compared with that of the 

 sense of touch itself whether or not it be warmer or 

 colder than the sense of touch. Taste is able also to 

 perceive the actuality of matter, for it, too, is touch, though 

 of a different kind ; and the Consciousness has thus the 

 testimony of two distinct and separate witnesses for the 

 actuality of matter, and two witnesses between which 

 there can be no collusion ; for they cannot, even if they 

 would, give the same testimony. Their evidence is 

 distinct, separate, and different in character, and its only 

 point of agreement is, not one of identity, but of corrobora- 

 tion. Taste cannot give the evidence of touch, nor touch 

 the evidence of taste ; but Consciousness is equally im- 

 pressed with them both. Taste discovers to our Con- 

 sciousness, not merely by actual contact like touch, that 

 matter is and has temperature, but also whether it has 

 certain immediately excitable chemical actions, or chemical 

 qualities, in addition to those which touch is capable of 

 perceiving. It is, in fact, a more sensitively endowed and 

 discriminating kind of touch, and exactly that more acute 

 and skilful sort of witness we should wish to test a 

 matter of fact further for us, after an ordinary witness, 

 on whom we commonly relied, had first reported and 



