43911 THE PLEBISCITES IN THE PEACE TREATIES I4I 



of all persons entitled to vote voted and they voted for the German 

 candidates nominated. As experience shows that at German elec- 

 tions about ten per cent of the electors are hindered from voting 

 for external reasons, the Poles can claim for themselves at the 

 highest only one-third of the vote. 



As an additional argument against the cession of Upper 

 Silesia, is cited the imperative need of Germany for the 

 Silesian coal. To this the Allied and Associated Powers 

 respond : 



It is recognized that the problem here differs from that in Posen 

 and West Prussia for the reason that Upper Silesia was not a part 

 of the Polish territories when dismembered by the Partition. It 

 may be said that Poland has no legal claim to the cession of Upper 

 Silesia; it is emphatically not true that she has no claim which could 

 be supported on the principles of President Wilson. In the district 

 to be ceded, the majority of the population is indisputably Polish. 

 Every German book of reference, every school book teaches the 

 German child that the inhabitants are Polish in origin and in speech. 

 The Allied and Associated Powers would have been acting in com- 

 plete violation of the principles which the German Government itself 

 professes to accept had they left unregarded the Polish claims to 

 this district. 



However, the revised draft of the treaty provides for a 

 plebiscite in Upper Silesia and guarantees Germany a 

 proper share in the output of the Silesian coal mines if the 

 vote should be favorable to the inclusion of the territory in 

 Poland. 



Concerning the cession of Posen the German reply objects 

 on the grounds that : " the province of Posen as a whole 

 cannot be regarded as a district inhabited by an indisput- 

 ably Polish population. Large parts of this province have 

 been inhabited for many centuries by a predominantly Ger- 

 man population ; outside these districts there are enclaves 

 of the same character." It charges that the proposed bound- 

 ary lines "are not based on the principle of nationality . . . 

 but on that of the strategic preparation of an attack against 

 German territories." In conclusion it is added that "these 

 [strategic] considerations, however, cannot possess any im- 

 portance if the relations between Germany and Poland in 

 the future arc to be subject to the regulations of the League 

 of Nations." 



