1 68 EMPLOYMENT OF THE PLEBISCITE [4^6 



popular, direct, or indirect votes, were opposed by the 

 sword, and the seceding states forced to rescind their de- 

 cisions. In both instances, however, the motive for the 

 difference of attitude towards the seceding units was based 

 on state pohcy and considerations of the legahty on the 

 principles of international law of the secession movements 

 as such,^* rather than on favorable or unfavorable opinions 

 regarding the plebiscites as justifying the demand for 

 secession. 



The plebiscites in the case of West Virginia and in Nor- 

 way had shown a practically unanimous vote, and nothing 

 short of war could have preserved the status quo. The 

 possibility of defeat and, on the other hand, the chances of 

 continued opposition of a sectional, hostile population in 

 case of victorious war, against the certainty of a gratified 

 and friendly neighbor, decided the issue in Norway which, 

 being tied to Sweden in a ' real union,' was thus not an 

 integral part of Sweden as a nation. Virginia was not an 

 independent State but only one of a union of States. By 

 Article IV, Sect. 3, of the United States Constitution it is 

 stipulated that " no new States should be formed or erected 

 within the jurisdiction of any other State . . . without the 

 consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well 

 as of the Congress." Since it was the section separating 

 from Virginia which remained loyal to the Union, the latter 

 had every reason to be favorably inclined towards the new 

 State. The secession of the rebellious Southern States from 

 the United States however involved the very existence of 

 the Union as such in so far as it brought to a climax the 

 issue of states' rights and federal rights, of state sovereignty 

 and federal sovereignty, the question whether the states 

 had a right to secede or not. The principle of self-preser- 

 vation forced the Union to a policy of war which decided 

 the issue against the secessionists. 



No less is it a question of a wise state policy on the part 

 of the acquiring state to sanction or even demand a plebi- 



'* See above, pp. 1 19-123. 



