467J ASPECTS OF THE PLEBISCITE 169 



scite in the annexed territory if by such an act it is sure to 

 estabHsh an outward sign of the desire or willingness of the 

 inhabitants to be annexed. 



On the other hand, the same motive would prompt a 

 policy of opposition to any public expression where and 

 when the result would be in doubt or be expected to be 

 negative. Where, however, in cases of doubt or certain 

 hostility of the population concerned, state policy has found 

 it advisable to consent to the fictitious promise of a popular 

 vote, reasons of state have made imperative the adoption of 

 measures which would tend to assure a favorable result of 

 the plebiscite. The historical review of the plebiscites of the 

 past offers sufficient material of illustration of this. 



If it is considered good policy on the part of the acquir- 

 ing state to favor a plebiscite where it promises approval 

 of its acquisition, it must be bad policy for a state to permit 

 a plebiscite where it would reveal a strong sentiment for 

 cession or secession of part of its domain. The same policy 

 would respectively dictate the inclination or disinclination 

 of a state to subscribe to the theory of popular consent as 

 a measure giving validity to the territorial changes contem- 

 plated or feared. It is thus easy to understand that a multi- 

 national, or multi-racial, state like the former Austro-Hun- 

 garian Empire, or Turkey, or Germany with the Polish, the 

 Danish and the Alsace-Lorraine problem, or Great Britain 

 with her colonies and dominions and hostile Ireland, or in 

 fact any federated state body, should in principle or prac- 

 tice be opposed to the doctrine of popular consent. It is this 

 that the French jurist alludes to when he writes that "the 

 principle of the plebiscite, if once adopted, entails grave and 

 dangerous consequences. Admitting the necessity of the 

 popular suffrage in the case of voluntary or enforced cession 

 of a province to another state, we cannot refute the preten- 

 tion raised by a part of a state to separate absolutely from 

 the other parts to join another state or to render itself inde- 

 pendent." lie asks, how is a fraction of a state, having 

 changed its mind, to be retained with the national union, as 



