t2 



INAMES AND l>ROPOSlTlONg. 



things proved and things not proved, 

 between what is worthy and what is 

 unworthy of belief. Of the various 

 questions which present themselves 

 to our inquiring faculties, some re- 

 ceive an answer from direct conscious- 

 ness, others, if resolved at all, can only 

 be resolved by means of evidence. 

 Logic is concerned with these last. 

 But before inquiring into the mode 

 of resolving questions, it is necessary 

 to inquire what are those which offer 

 themselves ; what questions are con- 

 ceivable ; what inquiries are there, to 

 which mankind have either obtained, 

 or been able to imagine it possible 

 that they should obtain, an answer. 

 This point is best ascertained by a 

 survey and analysis of Propositions. 



§ 2. The answer to every question 

 which it is possible to frame, must be 

 contained in a Proposition, or Asser- 

 tion. Whatever can be an object of 

 belief, or even of disbelief, must, when 

 put into words, assume the form of a 

 proposition. All truth and all error 

 lie in propositions. What, by a con- 

 venient misapplication of an abstract 

 term, we call a Truth, means simply 

 a True Proposition ; and errors are 

 false propositions. To know the im- 

 port of all possible propositions, would 

 be to know all questions which can 

 be raised, all matters which are sus- 

 ceptible of being either believed or 

 disbelieved. How many kinds of in- 

 quiries can be propounded ; how many 

 kinds of judgments can be made ; and 

 how many kinds of propositions is it 

 possible to frame with a meaning ; 

 are but different forms of one and the 

 same question. Since, then, the ob- 

 jects of all Belief and of all Inquiry 

 express themselves in propositions ; a 

 sufficient scrutiny of Propositions and 

 of their varieties will apprize us what 

 questions mankind have actually asked 

 of themselves, and what, in the nature 

 of answers to those questions, they 

 have actually thought they had 

 grounds to believe. 



Now the first glance at a proposi- 

 tion shows that it is formed by put- 



ting together two names. A proposi- 

 tion, according to the common simple 

 definition, which is sufficient for our 

 purpose, is, discourse, in ichich some- 

 thing is affirmed or denied of some- 

 thing. Thus, in the proposition, Gold 

 is yellow, the quality yelloiu is affirmed 

 of the substance gold. In the pro- 

 position, Franklin was not born in 

 England, the fact expressed by the 

 words horn in England is denied of 

 the man Pranklin. 



Every proposition consists of three 

 parts : the Subject, the Predicate, and 

 the Copula. The predicate is the 

 name denoting that which is affirmed 

 or denied. The subject is the name 

 denoting the person or thing which 

 something is affirmed or denied of. 

 The copula is the sign denoting that 

 there is an affirmation or denial ; and 

 thereby enabling the hearer or reader 

 to distinguish a proposition from any 

 other kind of discourse. Thus, in 

 the proposition, the earth is round, 

 the Predicate is the word round, 

 which denotes the quality affirmed, 

 or (as the phrase is) predicated : the 

 earth, words denoting the object which 

 that quality is affirmed of, compose 

 the Subject ; the word is, which serves 

 as the connecting mark between the 

 subject and predicate, to show that 

 one of them is affirmed of the other, 

 is called the Copula. 



Dismissing, for the present, the 

 copula, of which more will be said 

 hereafter, every proposition, then, 

 consists of at least two names ; brings 

 together two names, in a particular 

 manner. This is already a first step 

 towards what we are in quest of. It 

 appears from this, that for an act of 

 belief, one object is not sufficient ; 

 the simplest act of belief supposes, 

 and has something to do with, two 

 objects : two names, to say the least ; 

 and (since the names must be names 

 of something) two nameable things. 

 A large class of thinkers would cut 

 the matter short by saying, two ideas. 

 They would say, that the subject and 

 predicate are both of them names of 

 ideas, the idea of gold, for instance, 



