NECESSITY OF AN ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE. 



13 



and the idea of yellow ; and that 

 what takes place (or part of what 

 takes place) in the act of belief, con- 

 sists in bringing (as it is often ex- 

 pressed) one of these ideas under the 

 other. Eut this we are not yet in a 

 condition to say : whether such be 

 the correct mode of describing the 

 phenomenon, is an after considera- 

 tion. The result with which for the 

 present we must be contented, is, 

 that in every act of belief tico objects 

 are in some manner taken cognizance 

 of ; that there can be no belief 

 claimed, or question propounded, 

 which does not embrace two distinct 

 (either material or intellectual) sub- 

 jects of thought ; each of them cap- 

 able, or not, of being conceived by 

 itself, but incapable of being believed 

 bj'- itself. 



I may say, for instance, " the sun." 

 The word has a meaning, and suggests 

 that meaning to the mind of any one 

 who is listening to me. But suppose 

 I ask him. Whether it is true : 

 whether he believes it ? He can give 

 no answer. There is as yet nothing 

 to believe, or to disbelieve. Now, 

 however, let me make, of all possible 

 assertions respecting the sun, the one 

 which involves the least of reference 

 to any object besides itself ; let me 

 say, " the sun exists." Here, at once, 

 is something which a person can say 

 he believes. But here instead of only 

 one, we find two distinct objects of 

 conception : the sun is one object ; 

 existence is another. Let it not be 

 said that this second conception, 

 existence, is involved in the first ; 

 for the sun may be conceived as no 

 longer existing. " 'J'he sun " does 

 not convey all the meaning that is 

 conveyed by " the sun exists : " " my 

 father " does not include all the 

 meaning of "my father exists," for 

 he may be dead ; " a round square " 

 does not include the meaning of '* a 

 round souare exists," for it does not 

 and cannot exist. When I say " the 

 sun," " my father," or " a round 

 square," I do not call upon the hearer 

 for any belief or disbelief, nor can 



either the one or the other be afforded 

 me ; but if I say, "the sun exists," 

 " my father exists," or a " round 

 square exists," I call for belief ; and 

 should, in the first of the three in- 

 stances, meet with it ; in the second, 

 with belief or disbelief, as the case 

 might be ; in the third, with dis- 

 belief. 



§ 3, This first step in the analysis 

 of the object of belief, which, though 

 so obvious, will be found to be not 

 unimportant, is the only one which 

 we shall find it practicable to make 

 without a preliminary survey of lan- 

 guage. If we attempt to proceed 

 further in the same path, that is, to 

 analyse any further the import of 

 Propositions, we find forced upon us, 

 as a subject of previous consideration, 

 the import of Names. For every pro- 

 position consists of two names ; and 

 every proposition affirms or denies 

 one of these names, of the other. 

 Now what we do, what passes in our 

 mind, when we affirm or deny two 

 names of one another, must depend 

 on what they are names of ; since it 

 is with reference to that, and not to 

 the mere names themselves, that we 

 make the affirmation or denial. Here, 

 therefore, we find a new reason why 

 the signification of names, and the 

 relation generally between names and 

 the things signified by them, must 

 occupy the preliminary stage of the 

 inquiry we are engaged in. 



It may be objected that the mean- 

 ing of names can guide us at most 

 only to the opinions, possibly the 

 foolish and groundless opinions, which 

 mankind have formed concerning 

 things, and that as the object of 

 philosophy is truth, not opinion, the 

 philosopher should dismiss words and 

 look into things themselves, to ascer- 

 tain what questions can be asked and 

 answered in regard to them. This 

 advice (which no one has it in his 

 power to follow) is in reality an ex- 

 hortation to discard the whole fruits 

 of the labours of his predecessors, 

 and conduct himself as if he were the 



