NAMES. 



19 



objects on account of the quality ; and 

 we may therefore say, without impro- 

 priety, that the quality forms part of 

 its signification ; but a name can 

 only be said to stand for, or to be a 

 name of, the things of which it can 

 be predicated. We shall presently 

 see that all names which can be said 

 to have any signification, all names 

 by applying which to an individual 

 we give any information respecting 

 that individual, may be said to imply 

 an attribute of some sort ; but they 

 are not names of the attribute ; it 

 has its own proper abstract name. 



§ 5. This leads to the consideration 

 of a third great division of names, 

 into connotative and non-connotative, 

 the latter sometimes, but improperly, 

 called absolute. This is one of the 

 most important distinctions which we 

 shall have occasion te point out, and 

 one of those which go deepest into 

 the nature of language. 



A non-connotative term is one 

 which signifies a subject only, or an 

 attribute only. A connotative term 

 is one which denotes a subject, and 

 implies an attribute. By a subject is 

 here meant anything which possesses 

 attributes. Thus John, or London, 

 or England, are names which signify 

 a subject only. Whiteness, length, 

 virtue, signify an attribute only. 

 None of these names, therefore, are 

 connotative. Butw/tiie, lung, virtuous, 

 are connotative. The word white de- 

 notes all white things, as snow, paper, 

 the foam of the sea, &c., and implies, 

 or in the language of the schoolmen, 

 connotes* the attribute wkdeness. 

 The word white is not predicated of 

 the attribute, but of the subjects, 

 snow, &c. ; but when we predicate it 

 of them, we convey the meaning that 

 the attribute whiteness belongs to 

 them. The same may be said of the 

 other words above cited. Virtuous, 

 for example, is the name of a class, 

 which includes Socrates, Howard, the 



* Notare, to mark ; Connotare, to mark 

 along with ; to mark one thing with or in 

 addition to another. 



Man of Ross, and an undefinable 

 number of other individuals, past, 

 present, and to come. These indi- 

 viduals, collectively and severally, can 

 alone be said with propriety to be 

 denoted by the word : of them alone 

 can it properly be said to be a name. 

 But it is a name applied to all of 

 them in consequence of an attribute 

 which they are supposed to possess in 

 common, the attribute which has re- 

 ceived the name of virtue. It is 

 applied to all beings that are con- 

 sidered to possess this attribute ; and 

 to none which are not so considered. 



All concrete general names are con- 

 notative. The word man, for example, 

 denotes Peter, Jane, John, and an in- 

 definite number of other individuals, 

 of whom, taken as a class, it is the 

 name. But it is applied to them, 

 because they possess, and to signify 

 that they possess, certain attributes. 

 These seem to be, corporeity, animal 

 life, rationality, and a certain external 

 form, which for distinction we call 

 the human. Every existing thing, 

 which possessed all these attributes, 

 would be called a man ; and anything 

 which possessed none of them, or 

 only one, or two, or even three of 

 them without the fourth, would not 

 be so called. For example, if in the 

 interior of Africa there were to be 

 discovered a race of animals possess- 

 ing reason equal to that of human 

 beings, but with the form of an ele- 

 phant, they would not be called men. 

 Swift's Houyhnhnms would not be so 

 called. Or if such newly -discovered 

 beings possessed the form of man 

 without any vestige of reason, it is 

 probable that some other name than 

 that of man would be found for them. 

 How it happens that there can be 

 any doubt about the matter, will 

 appear hereafter. The word man, 

 therefore, signifies all these attributes, 

 and all subjects which possess these 

 attributes. But it can be predicated 

 only of the subjects. What we call 

 men, are the subjects, the individual 

 Stiles and Nokes ; not the qualities 

 by which their humanity is consti- 



