XAMBS. 



n 



what things it is a name of, we do 

 not learn the meaning of the name : 

 for to the same thing we may, with 

 equal propriety, apply many names, 

 not equivalent in meaning. Thus, I 

 call a certain man by the name 

 Sophroniscus : I call him by another 

 name, The father of Socrates. Both 

 these are names of the same indi- 

 vidual, but their meaning is altogether 

 different ; they are applied to that 

 individual for two different purposes : 

 the one, merely to distinguish him 

 from other persons who are spoken 

 of ; the other to indicate a fact relat- 

 ing to him, the fact that Socrates was 

 his son. I further apply to him these 

 other expressions : a man, a Greek, 

 an Athenian, a sculptor, an old man, 

 an honest man, a brave man. All 

 these are, or may be, names of So- 

 phroniscus, not indeed of him alone, 

 but of him and each of an indefinite 

 number of other human beings. Each 

 of these names is applied to Sophro- 

 niscus for a different reason, and by 

 each whoever understands its mean- 

 ing is apprised of a distinct fact or 

 number of facts concerning him ; but 

 those who knew nothing about the 

 names except that they were applic- 

 able to Sophroniscus, would be alto- 

 gether ignorant of their meaning. It 

 is even possible that I might know 

 every single individual of whom a 

 given name could be with truth 

 affirmed, and yet could not be said 

 to know the meaning of the name. 

 A child knows who are its brothers 

 and sisters, long before it has any 

 definite conception of the nature of 

 the facts which are involved in the 

 signification of those words. 



In some cases it is not easy to decide 

 precisely how much a particular word 

 does or does not connote ; that is, we 

 do not exactly know (the case not 

 having arisen) what degree of differ- 

 ence in the object would occasion a 

 difference in the name. Thus, it is 

 clear that the word man, besides 

 animal life and rationality, connotes 

 also a certain external form ; but it 

 would be impossible to say precisely 



what form ; that is, to decide hoW 

 great a deviation from the form ordi- 

 narily found in the beings whom we 

 are accustomed to call men, would 

 suffice in a newly-discovered race to 

 make us refuse them the name of man. 

 Rationality, also, being a quality which 

 admits of degrees, it has never been 

 settled what is the lowest degree of 

 that quality which would entitle any 

 creature to be considered a human 

 being. In all such cases, the meaning 

 of the general name is so far unsettled 

 and vague ; mankind have not come 

 to any positive agreement about the 

 matter. When we come to treat of 

 Classification, we shall have occasion 

 to show under what conditions this 

 vagueness may exist without practical 

 inconvenience ; and cases will appear 

 in which the ends of language are 

 better promoted by it than by com- 

 plete precision ; in order that, in 

 natural history for instance, indivi- 

 duals or species of no very marked 

 character may be ranged with those 

 more strongly characterised indivi- 

 duals or species, to which, in all their 

 properties taken together, they bear 

 the nearest resemblance. 



But this partial uncertainty in the 

 connotation of names can only be free 

 from mischief when guarded by strict 

 precautions. One of the chief sources, 

 indeed, of lax habits of thought, is the 

 custom of using connotative terms 

 without a distinctly ascertained conno- 

 tation, and with no more precise 

 notion of their meaning than can be 

 loosely collected from observing what 

 objects they are used to denote. It is 

 in this manner that we all acquire, 

 and inevitably so, our first knowledge 

 of our vernacular language. A child 

 learns the meaning of the words man, 

 or white, by hearing them applied to 

 a variety of individual objects, and 

 finding out, by a process of generali- 

 zation and analysis which he could 

 not himself describe, what those dif- 

 ferent objects have in common. In 

 the case of these two words the pro- 

 cess is so easy as to require no assist- 

 ance from culture ; the objects called 



