24 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



human beings, and the objects called 

 white, differing from all others by 

 qualities of a peculiarly definite and 

 obvious character. But in many 

 other cases, objects bear a general 

 resemblance to one another, which 

 leads to their being familiarly classed 

 together under a common name, 

 while, without more analytic habits 

 than the generality of mankind pos- 

 sess, it is not immediately apparent 

 what are the particular attributes, 

 upon the possession of which in com- 

 mon by them all, their general resem- 

 blance depends. When this is the 

 case, people use the name without any 

 recognised connotation, that is, with- 

 out any precise meaning ; they talk, 

 and consequently think, vaguely, and 

 remain contented to attach only the 

 same degree of significance to their 

 own words, which a child three years 

 old attaches to the words brother and 

 sister. The child at least is seldom 

 puzzled by the starting up of new 

 individuals, on whom he is ignorant 

 whether or not to confer the title ; 

 because there is usually an authority 

 close at hand competent to solve all 

 doubts. But a similar resource does 

 not exist in the generality of cases ; 

 and new objects are continually pre- 

 senting themselves to men, women, 

 and children, which they are called 

 upon to class propria motu. They, 

 accordingly, do this on no other prin- 

 ciple than that of superficial simi- 

 larity, giving to each new object the 

 name of that familiar object, the 

 idea of which it most readily recalls, 

 or which, on a cursory inspection, it 

 seems to them most to resemble : 

 as an unknown substance found in 

 the ground will be called, according 

 to its texture, earth, sand, or a stone. 

 In this manner, names creep on from 

 subject to subject, until all traces of 

 a common meaning sometimes dis- 

 appear, and the word comes to denote 

 a, number of things not only indepen- 

 dently of any common attribute, but 

 which have actually no attribute in 

 common ; or none but what is shared 

 by other things to which the name is 



capriciously refused.* Even scientific 

 writers have aided in this perversion 

 of general language from its purpose ; 

 sometimes because, like the vulgar, 

 they knew no better ; and sometimes 

 in deference to that aversion to admit 

 new words, which induces mankind, 

 on all subjects not considered tech- 

 nical to attempt to make the original 

 stock of names serve with but little 

 augmentation to express a constantly 

 increasing number of objects and 

 distinctions, and, consequently, to 

 express them in a manner progres- 

 sively more and more imperfect. 



To what a degree this loose mode 

 of classing and denominating objects 

 has rendered the vocabulary of mental 

 and moral philosophy unfit for the 

 purposes of accurate thinking, is best 

 known to whoever has most medi- 

 tated on the present condition of 

 those branches of knowledge. Since, 

 however, the introduction of a new 

 technical language as the vehicle of 

 speculations on subjects belonging to 

 the domain of daily discussion, is 

 extremely diflBcult to effect, and would 

 not be free from inconvenience even 

 if effected, the problem for the philo- 

 sopher, and one of the most difficult 

 which he has to resolve, is, in retain- 

 ing the existing phraseology, how 

 best to alleviate its imperfections. 

 This can only be accomplished by 



* " Take the familiar term Stone. It is 

 applied to mineral and rocky materials, to 

 the kernels of fruit, to the accumulations 

 in the gall-bladder and in the kidney; 

 while it is refused to polished minerals 

 (called gems), to rocks that have the 

 cleavage suited for roofing (slates), and to. 

 baked clay (bricks). It occurs in the 

 designation of the magnetic oxide of iron 

 (loadstone), and not in speaking of other 

 metallic ores. Such a term is wholly 

 unfit for accurate reasoning, unless hedged 

 round on every occasion by other phrases ; 

 as building stone, precious stone, gall 

 stone, (fee. Moreover, the methods of defi- 

 nition are baffled for want of sufficient 

 community to ground upon. There is no 

 quality uniformly present in the cases 

 where it is applied, and uniformly absent 

 whei-e it ia not applied ; hence the definer 

 would have to employ largely the licence 

 of striking off existing applications, and 

 taking in new ones."— Bain, Logic, ii. lya. 



