NAMES. 



25 



giving to every general concrete name 

 which there is frequent occasion to 

 predicate, a definite and fixed conno- 

 tation ; in order that it may be known 

 what attributes, when we call an 

 object by that name, we really mean 

 to predicate of the object. And the 

 question of most nicety is, how to 

 give this fixed connotation to a name, 

 with the least possible change in the 

 objects which the name is habitually 

 employed to denote ; with the least 

 possible disarrangement, either by 

 adding or substraction, of the group 

 of objects which, in however imper- 

 fect a manner, it serves to circum- 

 scribe and hold together ; and with 

 the least vitiation of the truth of any 

 propositions which are commonly re- 

 ceived as true. 



This desirable purpose, of giving 

 a fixed connotation where it is want- 

 ing, is the end aimed at whenever 

 any one attempts to give a definition 

 of a general name already in use ; 

 every definition of a connotative name 

 being an attempt either merely to 

 declare, or to declare and analyse, the 

 connotation of the name. And the 

 fact, that no questions which have 

 arisen in the moral sciences have been 

 subjects of keener controversy than 

 the definitions of almost all the lead- 

 ing expressions, is a proof how great 

 an extent the evil to which we have 

 adverted has attained. 



Names with indeterminate conno- 

 tation are not to be confounded with 

 names which have more than one 

 connotation, that is to say, ambiguous 

 words. A word may have several 

 meanings, but all of them fixed and 

 recognised ones ; as the word post, 

 for example, or the word box, the 

 various senses of which it would be 

 endless to enumerate. And the pau- 

 city of existing names, in comparison 

 with the demand for them, may often 

 render it advisable and even neces- 

 sary to retain a name in this multi- 

 plicity of acceptations, distinguishing 

 these so clearly as to prevent their 

 being confounded with one another. 

 Such a word may be considered as 



two or more names, accidentally 

 written and spoken alike. * 



* Before quitting the subject of conno- 

 tative names, it is proper to observe, that 

 the first writer who, iu our times, has 

 adopted from the schoolmen the word to 

 connote, Mr. James Mill, iu his Analysis of 

 the Phenomena of the Human Mind, employs 

 it in a signification difTeicut from that in 

 which it is liere used. He uses the word 

 in a sense coextensive with its etymology, 

 applying it to every case in which a name, 

 while pointing directly to one thing (which 

 is cousequently termed its signification), 

 includes also a tacit reference to some other 

 thing. In the case considered in the text, 

 that of concrete general names, his lan- 

 guage and mine are the converse of one 

 another. Considering (very justly) the 

 signification of the name to lie in the attri- 

 bute, he speaks of the word as noting the 

 attribute, and connoting the things possess- 

 ing the attribute. And he describes ab- 

 stract names as being properly concrete 

 names with their connotation dropped : 

 whereas, in my view, it is the denotation 

 which would be said to be dropped, what 

 was previously connoted becoming the 

 whole signification. 



In adopting a phraseology at variance 

 with that which so high an authority, and 

 one which I am less likely than any other 

 person to undervalue, has deliberately 

 sanctioned, I have been influenced by the 

 urgent necessity for a term exclusively 

 appropriated to express the manner in 

 wliich a concrete general name serves to 

 mark the attributes which are involved 

 in its signification. Ihis necessity can 

 scarcely be felt in its full force by any one 

 who has not found by experience how vain 

 is the attempt to communicate clear ideas 

 on the philosophy of language without 

 such a word. It is hardly an exaggeration 

 to say, that some of the most prevalent of 

 the errors with which Logic has been in- 

 fected and a large part of the cloudiness 

 and confusion of ideas which have en- 

 veloped it, would, in all probability, liave 

 been avoided, if a term had been in common 

 use to express exactly what I have signified 

 by the term to connote. And the school- 

 men to whom we are indebted for the 

 greater part of our logical language, gave 

 us this also, and in this very sense. For 

 though some of their general expressions 

 countenance the use of the word in the 

 more extensive and vague acceptation in 

 which it is taken by Mr. Mill, yet when 

 they had to define it specifically as a tech- 

 nical term, and to fix its meaning as such, 

 with that admirable precision which always 

 characterises their definitions, they clearly 

 explained that nothing was said to be con- 

 noted except /orm«, which word may gene- 

 rally, in their writings, be understood as 

 synonymous with attributes. 



Now, if the word to connote, so well 



