NAMM. 



27 



§ 7. The fifth leading division of 

 names is into relative and absolute, or 

 let us rather say, relative and non- 

 relative; for the word absolute is put 

 upon much too hard duty in meta- 

 physics, not to be willingly sp&red 

 when its services can be dispensed 

 with. It resembles the word civil in 

 the language of jurisprudence, which 

 stands for the opposite of criminal, 

 the opposite of ecclesiastical, the 

 opposite of military, the opposite of 

 political — in short, the opposite of 

 any positive word which wants a 

 negative. 



Relative names are such as father, 

 son ; ruler, subject ; like, equal ; un- 

 like, unequal ; longer, shorter ; cause, 

 effect. Their characteristic property 

 is, that they are always given in pairs. 

 Every relative name which is predi- 

 cated of an object, supposes another 

 object (or objects), of which we may 

 predicate either that same name or 

 another relative name which is said 

 to be the correlative of the former. 

 Thus, when we call any person a son, 

 we suppose other persons who must 

 be called parents. When we call 

 any event a cause, we suppose another 

 event which is an effect. When we 

 say of any distance that it is longer, 

 we suppose another distance which is 

 shorter. When we say of any object 

 that it is like, we mean that it is like 

 some other object, which is also said 

 to be like the first. In this last case 

 both objects receive the same name ; 

 the relative term is its own correlative. 



It is evident that these words, 

 when concrete, are, like other con- 

 crete general names, connotative ; 

 they denote a subject, and connote 

 an attribute ; and each of them has 

 or might have a corresponding ab- 

 stract name, to denote the attribute 

 connoted by the concrete. Thus the 

 concrete like has its abstract likeness ; 

 the concretes, father and son, have, 

 or might have, the abstracts, pater- 

 nity, and filiety, or sonship. The 

 concrete name connotes an attribute, 

 and the abstract name which answers 

 to it denotes that attribute. But of 



what nature is the attribute ? Where- 

 in consists the peculiarity in the con- 

 notation of a relative name? 



The attribute signified by a relatiT« 

 name, say some, is a relation ; and 

 this they give, rf not as a sufficient 

 explanation, at least as the only one 

 attainable. If they are asked. What, 

 then, is a relation ? they do not pro- 

 fess to be able to tell. It is generally 

 I regarded as something peculiarly re- 

 ! condite and mysterious. I cannot, 

 however, perceive in what respect it 

 is more so than any other attribute ; 

 indeed, it appears to me to be so in a 

 somewhat less degree. I conceive 

 rather, that it is by examining into 

 the signification of relative names, or, 

 in other words, into the nature of the 

 attribute which they connote, that a 

 clear insight may best be obtained 

 into the nature of all attributes : of 

 all that is meant by an attribute. 



It is obvious, in fact, that if we 

 take any two correlative names, 

 father and son for instance, though 

 the objects rfe-noted by the names 

 are different, they both, in a certain 

 sense, connote the same thing. They 

 cannot, indeed, be said to connote the 

 same attribute : to be a father, is not 

 the same thing as to be a son. But 

 when we call one man a father, 

 another a son, what we mean to 

 affirm is a set of facts, which are 

 exactly the same in both cases. To 

 predicate of A that he is the father 

 of B, and of B that he is the son of 

 A, is to assert one and the same fact 

 in different words. The two pro- 

 positions are exactly equivalent : 

 neither of them asserts more or 

 asserts less than the other. The 

 paternity of A and the filiety of B 

 are not two facts, but two modes of 

 expressing the same fact. That fact, 

 when analysed, consists of a series of 

 physical events or phenomena, in 

 which both A and B are parties con- 

 cerned, and from which they both 

 derive names. What those names 

 really connote, is this series of events : 

 that is the meaning, and the whole 

 meaning, which either of them is 



