THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



29 



ferred to the achievement in a deriva- 

 tive signification, supposed to be 

 somewhat like the primitive one. 

 The word, however, is just as properly 

 two names instead of one, in this 

 case, as in that of the most perfect 

 ambiguity. And one of tlie com- 

 monest forms of fallacious reasoning 

 arising from ambiguity, is that of 

 arguing from a metaphorical expres- 

 sion as if it were literal ; that is. as if 

 a word, when applied metaphorically, 

 were the same name as when taken 

 in its original sense : which will be 

 seen more particularly in its place. 



CHAPTER III. 



OP THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



§ I. Looking back now to the com- 

 mencement of our inquiry, let us 

 attempt to measure how far it has 

 advanced. Logic, we found, is the 

 Theory of Proof. But proof supposes 

 something provable, which must be a 

 Proposition or Assertion ; since no- 

 thing but a Proposition can be an 

 object of belief, or therefore of proof. 

 A Proposition is, discourse which 

 affirms or denies something of some 

 other thing. This is one step : there 

 must, it seems, be two things con- 

 cerned in every act of belief. But 

 what are these Things? They can 

 be no other than those signified by 

 the two names, which being joined 

 together by a copula constitute the 

 Proposition. If, therefore, we knew 

 what all names signify, we should 

 know everything which, in the exist- 

 ing state of human knowledge, is cap- 

 able either of being made a subject 

 of affirmation or denial, or of being 

 itself affirmed or denied of a subject. 

 We have accordingly, in the preced- 

 ing chapter, reviewed the various 

 kinds of Names, in order to ascertain 

 what is signified by each of them. 

 And we have now carried this survey 

 far enough to be able to take an 

 account of its results, and to exhibit 



an enumeration of all kinds of Things 

 I which are capable of being made pre- 

 I dicates, or of having anything predi- 

 cated of them : after which to determine 

 the import of Predication, that is, of 

 Propositions, can be no arduous task. 

 ! The necessity of an enumeration of 

 Existence, as the basis of Logic, did 

 not escape the attention of the school- 

 men, and of their master Aristotle, 

 the most comprehensive, if not also 

 the most sagacious, of the ancient 

 philosophers. The Categories, or Pre- 

 dicaments — the former a Greek word, 

 the latter its literal translation in the 

 Latin language — were believed to be 

 an enumeration of all things capable 

 of being named ; an enumeration by 

 the summa genera, i.e., the most ex- 

 tensive classes into which things 

 could be distributed ; which, there- 

 fore, were so many highest Predicates, 

 one or other of which was supposed 

 capable of being affirmed with truth 

 ! of every nameable thing whatsoever. 

 The following are the classes into 

 which, according to this school of 

 philosophy. Things in general might 

 be reduced : — 



The imperfections of this classifica- 

 tion are too obvious to require, and 

 its merits are not sufficient to reward, 

 a minute examination. It is a mere 

 catalogue of the distinctions rudely 

 marked out by the language of familiar 

 life, with little or no attempt to pene- 

 trate, by philosophic analysis, to the 

 rationale even of those common dis- 

 tinctions. Such an analysis, however 

 superficially conducted, would have 

 shown the enumeration to be both 

 redundant and defective. Some ob- 

 jects are omitted, and others repeated 

 several times under different heads. 

 It is like a division of animals into 



