CONTENTS. 



Xlll 



Chapter II. 



Of Abstraction, or the Formation of 

 Conceptions. 



SEC. PAGE 



1. The comparison which is a prelimi- 



nary to induction implies general 

 conceptions 424 



2. — but these need not be pre-exis- 



tent 425 



3. A general conception, originally tho 



result of a comparison, becomes 

 itself the type of comparison . . 427 



4. What is meant by appropriate con- 



ceptions . . . . . . , . 429 



5. — and by clear conceptions . . 430 



6. Further illustration of the subject 432 



Chapter III. 

 Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction. 



1. The fundamental property of names 



as an insiriiment of thought .. 433 



2. Names are not indispensable to in- 



duction 434 



3. In what manner subservient to it 435 



4. General names not a mere contriv- 



ance to economise the use of lan- 

 guage 436 



Chapter IV. 



Of the Requisites of a Philosophical 

 Language, and the Principles of De- 

 finition. 



1. First requisite of philosophical lan- 



guage, a steady and determinate I 



meaning for every general name 436 



2. Names in common use have often 



a loose connotation . . . . 436 



3. — wliich the logician should fix, 



with as little alteration as pes- j 



sible 438 I 



4. Vihy definition is often a question 



not of words but of things . . 439 



5. How the logician should deal with 



the transitive applications of 

 WO! ds . . . . . . . . . . 441 



6. Evil consequences of casting off any 



portion of the customary connota- 

 tion of words 



Chapter V. 



444 



On the Natural History of the VaHa- 

 tions in the Meaning of Terms. 



I. How circumstances originally acci- 

 dental become incorporated into 

 the meaning of words . . . . 448 



SEC. PAGE 



2. — and sometimes become the whole 



meaning .. 450 



3. Tendency of words to become gene- 



ralised .. .. 451 



4. — and to become specialised . . 453 



Chapter VI. 



The Principles of Philosophical Lan- 

 guage further considered. 



1. Second requisite of philosophical 



language, a name far every im- 

 portant meaning 455 



2. — viz. first, an accurate descrip- 



tive terminology 456 



3. — secondly, a name for each of the 



more important results of scien- 

 tific abstraction 458 



4. — thirdly, a nomenclature, or sys- 



tem of the names of Kinds . . 459 



5. Peculiar nature of the connotation 



of names which belong to a nomen- 

 clature 461 



6. In what cases language may, and 



may not, be used lucchauically . . 462 



Chapter VII. 



Of Classification as Subsidiary to In- 

 duction. 



1. Classification as here treated of, 



wherein different from the classi- 

 fication implied in naming . . 465 



2. Theory of natural groups . . . . 466 



3. Are natural groups given by type 



or by definition? 468 



4. Kinds are natural groups .. .. 470 



5. How the names of Kinds should be 



constructed 473 



Chapter VIII. 

 Of Classification by Series. 



1. Natural groups should be arranged 



in a natural series . . . . . . 475 



2. The arrangement should follow the 



degrees of the main phenome- 

 non 475 



3. — which implies the assumption 



of a type-species . . . . . . 476 



4. How the divisions of the series 



should be determined . . . . 477 



5. Zoology affords the completest type 



of scientific classification.. .. 478 



