CONTENTS. 



TO. 



BEC. PAGE 



3. Second mode ; by the detection of 



an intei-mediate link in the se- 

 quence 306 



4. Liiws are always resolved into laws 



more general than themselves .. 307 



5. Third mode ; the subsiimption of 



less general laws under a more 

 general one . . 308 



6. What the explanation of a law of 



nature amounts to 310 



Chapter XIII. 



Miscellaneous Examples of the Explana- 

 tion of Laics of Nature. 



1. The general theories of the sciences 311 



2. Examples from chemical specula- 



tions 312 



3. Example from Dr. Brown-Seqnard's 



researches on the nervous systcTu 313 



4. Examples of following newly-dis- 



covered laws into their complex 

 mjinifestations 314 



5. Examples of empirical generalisa- 



tions, afterwards confirmed and 

 explained deductively .. .. 315 



6. Example from mental science . . 316 



7. Tendency of all the sciences to be- 



come deductive 317 



Chapter xrv. 



Of the Limits to the Explanation of Laws 

 of Nature ; and of Hypotheses. 



1. Can all the seqxiences in nature be 



resolvable into one law? . . . . 318 



2. Ultimate laws cannot be less numer- 



ous than the distinguishable feel- 

 ings of o\ir nature 318 



3. In what sense ultimate facts can 



be explained .. 321 



4. The proper use of scientific hypo- 



theses . . . . 322 



5. Tiieir indispensableness . . . . 326 



6. The two degrees of legitimacy in 



hypotheses 327 



7. Some inquiries apparently hypo- 



thetical are really inductive .. 332 



Chapter XV. 



Of Progressive Effects ; and of the Con- 

 tinued Action of Causes. 



1. How a progressive effect results 



from the simple continuance of 

 the cause 333 



2. — and from the progressiveness of 



the cause 336 



3. Derivative laws generated from a 



single ultimate law 337 



Chapter XVI. 



Of Empirical Laws. 



1. Definition of an emi-irical law .. 338 



SEC. PACK 



2. Derivative laws commonly depend 



on collocations 339 



3. The collocations of the permanent 



causes are not reducible to any 

 law 340 



4. Hence empirical laws cannot be 



relied on beyond the limits of 

 actual experience . . . . . . 340 



5. Generalisations which rest only 011 



the Method of Agreement can 01. ly 



be received as empirical laws . . 341 



6. Signs from which an observed uni- 



fonnity of sequence may be pre- 

 sumed to be resolvable . . . . 342 



7. Two kinds of empirical laws . . 343 



Chapter XVII. 

 Of Chance and its Elimination. 



1. The proof of empirical laws de- 



pends on tiie theory of chance . . 344 



2. Cliance defined and characterised 345 



3. The elimination of chance . . . . 348 



4. Discovery of residual phenomena 



by eliminating chance .. .. 349 



5. The doctrine of chances .. .. 350 



Chapter XVIII. 

 Of the Calculation of Chances. 



1. Foundation of the doctrine of 



chances, as taught by mathe- 

 matics.. .•. ■.. .. .. 350 



2. The doctrine tenable .. .. 352 



3. On what foundation it really rests 352 



4. Its tiltimate dependence on causa- 



tion 355 



5. Theorem of the doctrine of chances 



which relates to the cause of a 

 given event 357 



6. How applicable to the elimination 



of chance 358 



Chapter XIX. 



Of the Extension of Derivative Laws to 

 Adjacent Cases. 



1. Derivative laws, when not causal, 



are almost always contingent on 

 collocations . . 360 



2. On what grounds they can be ex- 



tended to cases Ijej'ond the bounds 



of actual experience . . . . 361 



3. Those cases must be adjacent cases 362 



Chapter XX. 

 Of Analogy. 



1. Various senses of the word analogy 364 



2. Nature of analogical evidence . . 365 



3. On what circumstances its value 



depends 367 



