THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



33 



God, but the sun and God are not 

 thoughts ; his mental image, however, 

 of the sun, and his idea of God, are 

 thoughts ; states of his mind, not of 

 the objects themselves ; and so also 

 is his belief of the existence of the 

 sun, or of God ; or his disbelief, if the 

 case be so. Even imaginary objects 

 (which are said to exist only in our 

 ideas) are to be distinguished from 

 our ideas of them. I may think of a 

 hobgoblin, as I may think of the loaf 

 which was eaten yesterday, or of the 

 flower which will bloom to-morrow. 

 But the hobgoblin which never existed 

 is not the same thing with my idea 

 of a hobgoblin, any more than the 

 loaf which once existed is the same 

 thing with my idea of a loaf, or the 

 flower which does not yet exist, but 

 which will exist, is the same with my 

 idea of a flower. They are all, not 

 thoughts, but objects of thought ; 

 though at the present time all the 

 objects are alike non-existent. 



In like manner, a Sensation is to 

 be carefully distinguished from the 

 object which causes the sensation ; 

 our sensation of white from a white 

 object: nor is it less to be distinguished 

 from the attribute whiteness, which 

 we ascribe to the object in consequence 

 of its exciting the sensation. Unfor- 

 tunately for clearness and due dis- 

 crimination in considering these sub- 

 jects, our sensations seldom receive 

 separate names. "We have a name 

 for the objects which produce in us 

 a certain sensation : the word white. 

 We have a name for the quality in 

 those objects, to which we ascribe 

 the sensation : the name whiteness. 

 But when we speak of the sensation 

 itself (as we have not occasion to do 

 this often except in our scientific 

 speculations), language, which adapts 

 itself for the most part only to the 

 common uses of life, has provided us 

 with no single-worded or immediate 

 designation ; we must employ a cir- 

 cumlocution, and say, The sensation 

 of white, or The sensation of white- 

 ness ; we must denominate the sensa- 

 tion either from the object, or from 



the attribute, by which it is excited. 

 Yet the sensation, though it never 

 does, might very well be conceived to 

 exist, without anything whatever to 

 excite it. We can conceive it as 

 arising spontaneously in the mind. 

 But if it so arose, we should have 

 no name to denote it which would 

 not be a misnomer. In the case of 

 our sensations of hearing we are 

 better provided ; we have the word 

 Sound, and a whole vocabulary of 

 words to denote the various kinds of 

 sounds. For as we are often conscious 

 of these sensations in the absence of 

 any perceptible object, we can more 

 easily conceive having them in the 

 absence of any object whatever. We 

 need only shut our eyes and listen to 

 music, to have a conception of an uni- 

 verse with nothing in it except sounds, 

 and ourselves hearing them : and what 

 is easily conceived separately, easily 

 obtains a separate name. But in gene- 

 ral our names of sensations denote in- 

 discriminately the sensation and the 

 attribute. Thus, colour stands for the 

 sensations of white, red, &c., but also 

 for the quality in the coloured object. 

 We talk of the colours of things as 

 among their properties. 



§ 4. In the case of sensations, 

 another distinction has also to be 

 kept in view, which is often con- 

 founded, and never without mis- 

 chievous consequences. This is, the 

 distinction between the sensation it- 

 self, and the state of the bodily organs 

 which precedes the sensation, and 

 which constitutes the physical agency 

 by which it is produced. One of the 

 sources of confusion on this subject is 

 the division commonly made of feel- 

 ings into Bodily and Mental. Philoso- 

 phically speaking, there is no founda- 

 tion at all for this distinction ; even 

 sensations are states of the sentient 

 mind, not states of the body, as dis- 

 tinguished from it. What I am con- 

 scious of when I see the colour blue, 

 is B^ feeling of blue colour, which is 

 one thing ; the picture on my retina, 

 or the phenomenon of hitherto mys- 



