THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



35 



they all are feelings ; by which, let it 

 be said once more, I mean to imply 

 nothing of passivity, but simply that 

 they are psychological facts, facts 

 which take place in the mind, and are 

 to be carefully distinguished from the 

 external or physical facts with which 

 they may be connected either as 

 effects or as causes. 



§ 5. Among active states of mind, 

 there is, however, one species which 

 merits particular attention, because 

 it forms a principal part of the con- 

 notation of some important classes of 

 names. I mean volitions, or acts of 

 the will. When we speak of sentient 

 beings by relative names, a large 

 portion of the connotation of the 

 name usually consists of the actions 

 of those beings ; actions past, present, 

 and possible or probable future. Take, 

 for instance, the words Sovereign and 

 Subject. What meaning do these 

 words convey, but that of innumerable 

 actions, done or to be done by the 

 sovereign and the subjects, to or in 

 regard to one another reciprocally ? 

 So with the words physician and 

 patient, leader and follower, tutor and 

 pupil. In many cases the words also 

 connote actions which would be done 

 under certain contingencies by persons 

 other than those denoted : as the 

 words mortgagor and mortgagee, ob- 

 ligor and obligee, and many other 

 words expressive of legal relation, 

 which connote what a court of justice 

 would do to enforce the legal obligation 

 if not fulfilled. There are also words 

 which connote actions previously done 

 by persons other than those denoted 

 either by the name itself or by its 

 correlative ; as the word brother. 

 From those instances, it may be seen 

 how large a portion of the connota- 

 tion of names consists of actions. 

 Now what is an action ? Not one 

 thing, but a series of two things ; the 

 state of mind called a volition, fol- 

 lowed by an effect. The volition or 

 intention to produce the effect, is one 

 thing ; the effect produced in conse- 

 quepce of the iptei^tion, is another 



thing ; the two together constitute the 

 action. I f onn the purpose of instantly 

 moving nay arm ; that is a state of my 

 mind : my arm (not being tied or 

 paralytic) moves in obedience to my 

 purpose ; that is a physical fact, con- 

 sequent on a state of mind. The inten- 

 tion, followed by the fact, or (if we 

 prefer the expression) the fact when 

 preceded and caused by the intention, 

 is called the action of moving my arm. 



§ 6. Of the first leading division of 

 nameable things, viz., Feelings or 

 States of Consciousness, we began by 

 recognising three sub-divisions ; Sen- 

 sations, Thoughts, and Emotions. 

 The first two of these we have illus- 

 trated at considerable length ; the 

 third. Emotions, not being perplexed 

 by similar ambiguities, does not re- 

 quire similar exemplification. And, 

 finally, we have found it necessary to 

 add to these three a fourth species, 

 commonly known by the name Voli- 

 tions. We shall now proceed to the 

 two remaining classes of nameable 

 things ; all things which are regarded 

 as external to the mind being con- 

 sidered as belonging either to the class 

 of Substances or to that of Attributes. 



II. Substances. 



Logicians have endeavoured to de- 

 fine Substance and Attribute ; but 

 their definitions are not so much 

 attempts to draw a distinction between 

 the things themselves, as instructions 

 what difference it is customary to 

 make in the grammatical structure of 

 the sentence, according as we are 

 speaking of substances or of attributes. 

 Such definitions are rather lessons of 

 English, or of Greek, Latin, or Ger- 

 man, than of mental philosophy. An 

 attribute, say the school logicians, 

 must be the attribute of something : 

 colour, for example, nmst be the colour 

 of something ; goodness must be the 

 goodness of something ; and if this 

 something should cease to exist, or 

 should cease to be connected with the 

 ftttribiite, the existence of th^ J^Hri- 



