36 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



bute would be at an end, A substance, 

 on the contrary, is self-existent ; in 

 speaking about it, we need not put of 

 after its name. A stone is not the 

 stone of anything ; the moon is not 

 the moon of anything, but simply the 

 moon. Unless, indeed, the name 

 which we choose to give to the sub- 

 stance be a relative name ; if so, it 

 must be followed either by of, or by 

 some other particle, implying, as that 

 proposition does, a reference to some- 

 thing else : but then the other char- 

 acteristic peculiarity of an attribute 

 would fail ; the something might be 

 destroyed, and the substance might 

 still subsist. Thus, a father must be 

 the father of something, and so far 

 resembles an attribute, in being re- 

 ferred to something besides himself : 

 if there were no child, there would be 

 no father : but this, when we look 

 into the matter, only means that we 

 should not call him father. The man 

 called father might still exist though 

 there were no child, as he existed be- 

 fore there was a child : and there 

 would be no contradiction in suppos- 

 ing him to exist, though the whole uni- 

 verse except himself were destroyed. 

 But destroy all white substances, and 

 where would be the attribute white- 

 ness ? Whiteness, without any white 

 thing, is a contradiction in terms. 



This is the nearest approach to a 

 solution of the difficulty, that will be 

 found in the common treatises on 

 logic. It will scarcely be thought to 

 be a satisfactory one. If an attribute 

 is distinguished from a substance by 

 being the attribute of something, it 

 seems highly necessary to understand 

 what is meant by of ; a particle which 

 needs explanation too much itself, to 

 be placed in front of the explanation 

 of anything else. And as for the 

 self -existence of substance, it is very 

 true that a substance may be con- 

 ceived to exist without any other sub- 

 stance, but so also may an attribute 

 without any other attribute ; and we 

 can no more imagine a substance with- 

 out attributes than we can imagine 

 attributes withput a sub^taijce. 



Metaphysicians, however, have 

 probed the question deeper, and given 

 an account of Substance considerably 

 more satisfactory than this. Substances 

 are usually distinguished as Bodies or 

 Minds. Of each of these, philosophers 

 have at length provided us with a defi- 

 nition which seems unexceptionable. 



§ 7. A body, according to the re- 

 ceived doctrine of modem metaphysi- 

 cians, may be defined, the external 

 cause to which we ascribe our sensa- 

 tions. When I see and touch a piece of 

 gold, I am conscious of a sensation of 

 yellow colour, and sensations of hard- 

 ness and weight ; and by varying the 

 mode of handling, I may add to these 

 sensations many others completely 

 distinct from them. The sensations 

 are all of which I am directly con- 

 scious ; but I consider them as pro- 

 duced by something not only existing 

 independently of my will, but externa] 

 to my bodily organs and to my mind. 

 This external something I call a body. 



It may be asked, how come we to 

 ascribe our sensations to any external 

 cause ? And is there sufficient ground 

 for so ascribing them ? It is known, 

 that there are metaphysicians who 

 have raised a controversy on the 

 point ; maintaining that we are not 

 warranted in referring our sensations 

 to a cause such as we understand by 

 the word Body, or to any external 

 cause whatever. Though we have 

 no concern here with this controversy, 

 nor with the metaphysical niceties 

 on which it turns, one of the best 

 ways of showing what is meant by Sub- 

 stance is, to consider what position it is 

 necessary to take up, in order to main- 

 tain its existence against opponents. 



It is certain, then, that a part of 

 our notion of a body consists of the 

 notion of a number of sensations of 

 our own, or of other sentient beings, 

 habitually occurring simultaneously. 

 My conception of the table at which 

 I am writing is compounded of its 

 visible form and size, which are com- 

 plex sensations of sight ; its tangible 

 form and size, which a,XQ comple^f 



