38 



NAMES AKD PROPOSITIONS. 



soon, however, acknowledged by all 

 who reflected on the subject, that the 

 existence of matter cannot be proved 

 by extrinsic evidence. The answer, 

 therefore, now usually made to Berke- 

 ley and his followers, is, that the belief 

 is intuitive ; that mankind, in all ages, 

 have felt themselves compelled, by a 

 necessity of their nature, to refer their 

 sensations to an external cause : that 

 even those who deny it in theory, 

 yield to the necessity in practice, and 

 both in speech, thought, and feeling, 

 do, equally with the vulgar, acknow- 

 ledge their sensations to be the effects 

 of something external to them : this 

 knowledge, therefore, it is affirmed, is 

 as evidently intuitive as our know- 

 ledge of our sensations themselves is 

 intuitive. And here the question 

 merges in the fundamental problem 

 of metaphysics properly so called : to 

 which science we leave it. 



But although the extreme doctrine 

 of the Idealist metaphysicians, that 

 objects are nothing but our sensations 

 and the laws which connect them, has 

 not been generally adopted by subse- 

 quent thinkers ; the point of most 

 real importance is one on which those 

 metaphysicians are now very generally 

 considered to have made out their 

 case : viz., that all we knoiooi objects, 

 is the sensations which they give us, 

 and the order of the occurrence of 

 those sensations. Kant himself, on 

 this point, is as explicit as Berkeley 

 or Locke. However firmly convinced 

 that there exists an universeof "Things 

 in themselves," totally distinct from 

 the universe of phenomena, or of things 

 as they appear to our senses ; and 

 even when bringing into use a tech- 

 nical expression [Noumenon) to denote 

 what the thing is in itself, as con- 

 trasted with the representation of it in 

 our minds ; he allows that this repre- 

 sentation (the matter of which, he 

 says, consists of our sensations, though 

 the form is given by the laws of the 

 mind itself) is all we know of the 

 object : and that the real nature of 

 the Thing is, and by the constitution 

 of our faculties ever must remain, at 



least in the present state of existence, 

 an impenetrable mystery to us. " Of 

 things absolutely or in themselves," 

 says Sir William Hamilton,* " be they 

 external, be they internal, we know 

 nothing, or know them only as incog- 

 nisable ; and become aware of their 

 incomprehensible existence, only as 

 this is indirectly and accidentally 

 revealed to us, through certain quali- 

 ties related to our faculties of know- 

 ledge, and which qualities, again, we 

 cannot think as unconditioned, irre- 

 lative, existent in and of themselves. 

 All that we know is therefore phaeno- 

 menal, — phsenomenal of the un- 

 known." t The same doctrine is laid 

 down in the clearest and strongest 

 terms by M. Cousin, whose observa- 

 tions on the subject are the more 

 worthy of attention, as, in consequence 

 of the ultra-German and ontological 

 character of his philosophy in other 

 respects, they may be regarded as the 

 admissions of an opponent.^ 



* Discussions on Philosophy, &c. Appen- 

 dix I. pp. 643-4. 



t It is to be regretted that Sir William 

 Hamilton, though he often strenuously in- 

 sists ou this doctrine, and though, in the 

 passage quoted, he states it with a compre- 

 hensiveness and force which leave nothing 

 to be desired, did not consistently adhere 

 to his own doctrine, but maintained along 

 with it opinions with which it is utterly 

 irreconcilable. See the third and other 

 chapters of ^n Examination of Sir William 

 Hamilton's Philosophy. 



t "Nous savons qu'il existe quelque 

 chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pou- 

 vons expliquer nos perceptions sans lea 

 rattacber k des causes distinctes de nous- 

 mfimes ; n<ius savons de plus que ces causes, 

 dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleura 

 I'essence, produisent les effets les plus vari- 

 ables, les plus divers, et meme les plus con- 

 traires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle 

 nature ou telle disposition du sujet. Mais 

 savons-nous quelque chose de plus? et 

 meme, vu le caractfere ind6termine des 

 causes que nous concevons dans les corps, 

 y a-t-il quelque chose de plus k savoir? Y 

 a-t-il lieu de nous enquerir si nous perce- 

 vons les choses telles qu'elles sont? Non 

 evidemment. . . . Je ne dispas que lepro- 

 blfeme est insoluble, jedts qu'il est absurde et 

 enferme une contradiction. Nous ne savons 

 pas ce que ces causes sont en elles-mf,mes, et 

 la raison nous defend de chercher a le con- 

 naitre : mais il est bien Evident a priori, 

 qvi'elles ne sont pas en elles-memes ce qu'elUt 



