THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



39 



There is not the slightest reason for 

 believing that what we call the sen- 

 sible qualities of the object are a type 

 of anything inherent in itself, or bear 

 any affinity to its own nature. A 

 cause does not, as such, resemble its 

 effects ; an east wind is not like the 

 feeling of cold, nor heat like the steam 

 of boiling water. Why then should 

 matter resemble our sensations ? 

 Why should the inmost nature of fire 

 and water resemble the impressions 

 made by those objects upon our 

 ? * Or on what principle are 



$<mt par rapport a nout, puisque la presence 

 du sujet modifie necessairement leur action. 

 Supprimez tout sujet sentant, il est certain 

 que ces causes agiraient encore puisqu'elles 

 continueraient d'exister; mais elles agi- 

 raient autrement ; elles seraient encore des 

 qualit^s et des propri^t^s, mais qui ne 

 ressembleraient k rien de ce que nous con- 

 naissons. Le feu ne maniiestetait plus 

 aucTine des propri^t^s que nous lui con- 

 naissons : que serait-il? C'est ce que nous 

 ne saurons jamais. C'ett d'ailleurs pent- 

 Stre un probleme qui ne repugnepas seulement 

 a la nature de notre esprit, mais n I'essence 

 ndme des chones. Quand mfime en effet on 

 Bupprimerait par le pens^e tous les svijets 

 sentants, il faudrait encore admettre que 

 nul corps ne manifesterait ses propri^t^s 

 autrement qu'en relation avec un sujet 

 quelcoiique, et dans ce cas ses proprietis ne 

 seraient encore que relatives : en sorte qu'il 

 me parait fort raisonnable d'admettre que 

 les proprieties d^terminees des corps n'exis- 

 tent pas indepeudamment d'un sujot quel- 

 coiique, et que quand on demande si les 

 proprietds de la mati^re sont telles que 

 nous les porcevons, il faudrait voir aupara- 

 vant si elles sont en tant qtie determin6ea>, 

 et dans quel sens il est vrai de dire qu'elles 

 sont." — Cours d'Hittoire de la Fhilosophie 

 Morale au iSme siecle, 8me leqon. 



* An attempt, indeed, has been made by 

 Reid and others, to establish that although 

 some of the properties we ascribe to objects 

 exist only in our sensations, others exist 

 in the things themselves, being such as 

 cannot possibly be copies of any impression 

 upon the senses ; and they ask, from what 

 sensations our notions of extension and 

 figure have been derived? The gauntlet 

 thrown down by Reid was taken up by 

 Brown, who, applying greater powers of 

 analysis than had previously been applied 

 to tiie notions of extension and figure, 

 pointed out that the sensations from which 

 those notions are derived, are -ensations 

 of touch, combined with sensations of a 

 class previously too little adverted to by 

 metaphysicians, those which have their 

 seat in our muscular frame. His analysis, 



we authorized to deduce from the 

 effects, an)rthing concerning the cause, 

 except that it is a cause adequate to 

 produce those effects ? It may, there- 

 fore, safely be laid down as a truth 

 both obvious in itself, and admitted 

 by all whom it is at present necessary 

 to take into consideration, that, of the 

 outward world, we know and can know 

 absolutely nothing, except the sensa- 

 tions which we experience from it.f 



§ 8. Body having now been defined 

 the external cause, and (according to 



which was adopted and followed up by 

 James Mill, has been further and greatly 

 improved upon in Professor Bain's pro- 

 found work. The Senses and the Intellect, 

 and in the chapters on " Perception " o£ 

 a work of eminent analytic power, Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer's Principles of P»ycho- 



On this point M. Cousin may again be 

 cited in favour of the better df.ctiine. M. 

 Cousin recognises, in opposition to Reid, 

 the essential subjectivity of our concep- 

 tions of what are called the primary quaU- 

 ties of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., 

 equally with those of colour, heat, and the 

 remainder of the so-called secondary quali- 

 ties.— Cowri, ut supra, gme IcQon. 



t This doctrine, which is the most com. 

 plete form of the philosophical theory 

 known as the Relativity of Human Know- 

 ledge, has, since the recent revival in this 

 country of an active interest in metaphy- 

 sical speculation, been the subject of a 

 greatly increased amount of discussion and 

 controversy ; and dissentients have mani- 

 fested themselves in considt-rably gieater 

 number than I had any knowledge of when 

 the passage in the text was written. The 

 doctrine has been attacked from two sides. 

 Some thinkers, among whom are the late 

 Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of Meta- 

 physic, and Professor John Grote, in his 

 Erploratio Philosophica, appear to deny 

 altogether the reality of Noumena, or 

 Things in themselves — of an unknowable 

 substratum or support for the sensations 

 which we experience, and which, according 

 to the theory, constitute all our knowledge 

 of an external -world. It seems to me, 

 however, that in Professor Grote's case at 

 least, the denial of Noumena is only ap- 

 parent, and that he does not essentially 

 differ from the other class of objectors, in- 

 cluding Mr. Bailey in his valuable Letters 

 on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and 

 (in spite ot the striking passage quoted in 

 the text) also Sir William Hamilton, who 

 contend for a direct knowledge by the 

 human mind of more than the sensations 

 — of certain attributes or properties as they 



