40 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



the more reasonable opinion) the un- 

 known external cause, to which we re- 

 fer our sensations ; it remains to frame 

 a definition of Mind. Nor, after the 

 preceding observations, will this be 

 difficult. For, as our conception of a 

 body is that of an unknown exciting 

 cause of sensations, so our conception 

 of a mind is that of an unknown 

 recipient, or percipient, of them ; and 

 not of them alone, but of all our 

 other feelings. As body is under- 

 stood to be the mysterious something 

 which excites the mind to feel, so 

 mind is the mysterious something 

 which feels and thinks. It is un- 

 necessary to give in the case of mind, 

 as we gave in the case of matter, a 

 particular statement of the sceptical 

 system by which its existence as a 

 Thing in itself, distinct from the series 

 of what are denominated its states, is 

 called in question. But it is necessary 

 to remark, that on the inmost nature 

 (whatever be meant by inmost nature) 

 of the thinking principle, as well as 

 on the inmost nature of matter, we 

 are, and with our faculties must 

 always remain, entirely in the dark. 

 All which we are aware of, even in 

 our own minds, is (in the words of 



exist not in us, but in the Things them- 

 selves. 



With the first of these opinions, that 

 which denies Noumena, I have, as a meta- 

 physician, no quarrel ; but whether it be 

 true or false, it is irrelevant to Logic. And 

 since all the forms of language are in con- 

 tradiction to it, nothing but confusion 

 could result from its unnecessary intro- 

 duction into a treatise, every essential doc- 

 trine of which could stand equally well 

 with the opposite and accredited opinion. 

 The other and rival doctrine, that of a 

 direct perception or intuitive knowledge 

 of the outward object as it is in itself, con- 

 sidered as distinct from the sensations we 

 receive from it, is of far greater practical 

 moment. But even this question, depend- 

 ing on the nature and laws of Intuitive 

 Knowledge, is not within the province of 

 Logic. For the grounds of my own opinion 

 concerning it, I must content myself with 

 referring to a work already mentioned — 

 An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's 

 Philosophy: several chapters of which are 

 devoted to a full discussion of the questions 

 and theories relating to the supposed direct 

 perception of external objects. 



James Mill) a certain "thread of 

 consciousness ; " a series of feelings, 

 that is, of sensations, thoughts, emo- 

 tions, and volitions, more or less 

 numerous and complicated. There is 

 something I call Myself, or, by 

 another form of expression, my mind, 

 which I consider as distinct from 

 these sensations, thoughts, &c. ; a 

 something which I conceive to be not 

 the thoughts, but the being that has 

 the thoughts, and which I can con- 

 ceive as existing for ever in a state of 

 quiescence, without any thoughts at 

 all. But what this being is, though 

 it is myself, I have no knowledge, 

 other than the series of its states of 

 consciousness. As bodies manifest 

 themselves to me only through the 

 sensations of which I regard them as 

 the causes, so the thinking principle, 

 or mind, in my own nature, makes 

 itself known to me only by the feel- 

 ings of which it is conscious. I 

 know nothing about myself, save my 

 capacities of feeling or being conscious 

 (including, of course, thinking and 

 willing) : and were I to learn any- 

 thing new concerning my own nature, 

 I cannot with my present faculties 

 conceive this new information to be 

 anything else, than that I have some 

 additional capacities, as yet unknown 

 to me, of feeling, thinking, or willing. 

 Thus, then, as body is the unsen- 

 tient cause to which we are naturally 

 prompted to refer a certain portion of 

 our feelings, so mind may be described 

 as the sentient subject (in the scholastic 

 sense of the term) of all feelings ; that 

 which has or feels them. But of the 

 nature of either body or mind, further 

 than the feelings which the former 

 excites, and which the latter experi- 

 ences, we do not, according to the 

 best existing doctrine, know any- 

 thing ; and if anything, logic has 

 nothing to do with it, or with the 

 manner in which the knowledge is 

 acquired. "With this result we may 

 conclude this portion of our subject, 

 and pass to the third and only re- 

 maining class or division of Nameable 

 Things. 



