THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES 



41 



III. Attributes, and, first, 

 Qualities. 



§ 9. From what has already been 

 said of Substance, what is to be said 

 of Attribute is easily deducible. For 

 if we know not, and cannot know, 

 anything of bodies but the sensa- 

 tions which they excite in us or in 

 others, those sensations must be all 

 that we can, at bottom, mean by 

 their attributes ; and the distinction 

 which we verbally make between the 

 properties of things and the sensations 

 we receive from them, must originate 

 in the convenience of discourse rather 

 than in the nature of what is signified 

 by the terms. 



Attributes are usually distributed 

 under the three heads of Quality, 

 Quantity, and Relation. We shall 

 come to the two latter presently : in 

 the first place we shall confine our- 

 selves to the former. 



Let us take, then, as our example, 

 one of what are termed the sensible 

 qualities of objects, and let that 

 example be whiteness. When we 

 ascribe whiteness to any substance, 

 as, for instance, snow ; when we say 

 that snow has the quality whiteness, 

 what do we really assert ? Simply, 

 that when snow is present to our 

 organs, we have a particular sensa- 

 tion, which we are accustomed to call 

 the sensation of white. But how do 

 I know that snow is present ? Obvi- 

 ously by the sensations which I derive 

 from it, and not otherwise. I infer 

 that the object is present, because it 

 gives me a certain assemblage or 

 series of sensations. And when I 

 ascribe to it the attribute whiteness, 

 my meaning is only, that, of the 

 sensations composing this group or 

 series, that which I call the sensation 

 of white colour is one. 



This is one view which may be 

 taken of the subject. But there is 

 also another and a different view. 

 It may be said, that it is true we 

 know nothing of sensible objects, 

 except the sensations they excite in 

 us; that the fact of our receiving 

 from snow the particular sensation 



which is called a sensation of white, 

 is the ground on which we ascribe to 

 that substance the quality whiteness ; 

 the sole proof of its possessing that 

 quality. But because one thing may 

 be the sole evidence of the existence 

 of another thing, it does not follow 

 that the two are one and the same. 

 The attribute whiteness (it may be 

 said) is not the fact of receiving the 

 sensation, but something in the object 

 itself ; a power inherent in it ; some- 

 thing in virtue of which the object 

 produces the sensation. And when 

 we affirm that snow possesses the 

 attribute whiteness, we do not merely 

 assert that the presence of snow pro- 

 duces in us that sensation, but that it 

 does so through, and by reason of, 

 that power or quality. 



For the purposes of logic it is not 

 of material importance which of these 

 opinions we adopt. The full discus- 

 sion of the subject belongs to the 

 other department of scientific en- 

 quiry, so often alluded to under the 

 name of metaphysics ; but it may be 

 said here, that for the doctrine of the 

 existence of a peculiar species of 

 entities called qualities, I can see no 

 foundation except in a tendency of 

 the human mind which is the cause 

 of many delusions. I mean, the dis- 

 position, wherever we meet with two 

 names which are not precisely synony- 

 mous, to suppose that they must be 

 the names of two different things ; 

 whereas in reality they may be names 

 of the same thing viewed in two dif- 

 ferent lights, or under different sup- 

 positions as to surrounding circum- 

 stances. Because quality and sensation 

 cannot be put indiscriminately one 

 for the other, it is supposed that they 

 cannot both signify the same thing, 

 namely, the impression or feeling with 

 which we are affected through our 

 senses by the presence of an object ; 

 though there is at least no absurdity 

 in supposing that this identical im- 

 pression or feeling may be called a 

 sensation when considered merely in 

 itself, and a quality when looked at 

 in relation to any one of the numerous 



