42 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



objects, the presence of which to our 

 organs excites in our minds that 

 among various other sensations or 

 feelings. And if this be admissible as 

 a supposition, it rests with those who 

 contend for an entity per se called a 

 quality, to show that their opinion is 

 preferable, or is anything in fact but 

 a lingering remnant of the old doctrine 

 of occult causes : the very absurdity 

 which Moliere so happily ridiculed 

 when he made one of his pedantic 

 physicians account for the fact that 

 opium produces sleep by the maxim, 

 Because it has a soporific virtue. 



It is evident that when the physician 

 stated that opium has a soporific 

 virtue, he did not account for, but 

 merely asserted over again, the fact 

 that it produces sleep. In like 

 manner, when we say that snow is 

 white because it has the quality of 

 whiteness, we are only re-asserting in 

 more technical language the fact that 

 it excites in us the sensation of white. 

 If it be said that the sensation must 

 have some cause, I answer, its cause 

 is the presence of the assemblage of 

 phenomena which is termed the 

 object. When we have asserted that 

 as often as the object is present, and 

 our organs in their normal state, the 

 sensation takes place, we have stated 

 all that we know about the matter. 

 There is no need, after assigning a 

 certain and intelligible cause, to 

 suppose an occult cause besides, for 

 the purpose of enabling the real cause 

 to produce its effect. If I am asked, 

 why does the presence of the object 

 cause this sensation in me, I cannot 

 tell : I can only say that such is my 

 nature, and the nature of the object ; 

 that the fact forms a part of the con- 

 stitution of things. And to this we 

 must at last come, even after inter- 

 polating the imaginary entity. What- 

 ever number of links the chain of 

 causes and effects may consist of, how 

 any one link pBoduces the one which 

 is next to it, remains equally inex- 

 plicable to us. It is as easy to com- 

 prehend that the object should pro- 

 duce the sensation directly and at. 



once, as that it should produce the 

 same sensation by the aid of some- 

 thing else called the power of produc- 

 ing it. 



But, as the difficulties which may 

 be felt in adopting this view of the 

 subject cannot be removed without 

 discussions transcending the bounds 

 of our science, I content myself with 

 a passing indication, and shall, for 

 the purposes of logic, adopt a language 

 compatible with either view of the 

 nature of qualities. I shall say, — 

 what at least admits of no dispute, — 

 that the quality of whiteness ascribed 

 to the object snow, is grounded on its 

 exciting in us the sensation of white ; 

 and adopting the language already 

 used by the school logicians in the 

 case of the kind of attributes called 

 Relations, I shall term the sensation 

 of white the foundation of the quality 

 whiteness. For logical purposes the 

 sensation is the only essential part of 

 what is meant by the word ; the only 

 part which we ever can be concerned 

 in proving. When that is proved, the 

 quality is proved ; if an object ex- 

 cites a sensation, it has, of course, 

 the power of exciting it. 



rv. Relahons. 



§ 10. The qualities of a body, we 

 have said, are the attributes grounded 

 on the sensations which the presence 

 of that particular body to our organs 

 excites in our minds. But when we 

 ascribe to any object the kind of 

 attribute called a Relation, the founda- 

 tion of the attribute must be something 

 in which other objects are concerned 

 besides itself and the percipient. 



As there may with propriety be 

 said to be a relation between any 

 two things to which two correlative 

 names are or may be given, we may 

 expect to discover what constitutes a 

 relation in general, if we enumerate 

 the principal cases in which mankind 

 have imposed correlative names, and 

 observe what these cases have in 

 common. 



What, then, is the character which 



