THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



43 



is possessed in common by states of 

 circumstances so heterogeneous and 

 discordant as these : one thing like 

 another ; one thing unlike ant)ther ; 

 one thing near another ; one thing far 

 from another ; one thing before, after, 

 along with another ; one thing greater, 

 equaJ, less, than another ; one thing 

 the cause of another, the effect of 

 another ; one person the master, ser- 

 vant, child, parent, debtor, creditor, 

 sovereign, subject, attorney, client, of 

 another, and so on ? 



Omitting, for the present, the case 

 of Resemblance, (a relation which 

 requires to be considered separately,) 

 there seems to be one thing common 

 to all these cases, and only one ; that 

 in each of them there exists or occurs, 

 or has existed or occurred, or may be 

 expected to exist or occur, some fact 

 or phenomenon, into which the two 

 things which are said to be related to 

 each other, both enter as parties con- 

 cerned. This fact, or phenomenon, 

 is what the Aristotelian logicians 

 called the fundamentum relationis. 

 Thus in the relation of greater and 

 less between two magnitudes, the 

 fundamentum relationis is the fact 

 that one of the two magnitudes could, 

 under certain conditions, be included 

 in, without entirely filling, the space 

 occupied by the other magnitude. In 

 the relation of master and servant, 

 the fundamentum relationis is the fact 

 that the one has undertaken, or is 

 compelled, to perform certain services 

 for the benefit and at the bidding of 

 the other. Examples might be inde- 

 finitely multiplied ; but it is already 

 obvious that whenever two things are 

 said to be related, there is some fact, 

 or series of facts, into which they 

 both enter : and that whenever any 

 two things are involved in some one 

 fact, or series of facts, we may ascribe 

 to those two things a mutual relation 

 grounded on the fact. Even if they 

 have nothing in common but what 

 is common to all things, that they 

 are members of the universe, we call 

 that a relation, and denominate them 

 fellow-creatures, fellow-beings, or fel- 



low-denizens of the universe. But 

 in proportion as the fact into which 

 the two objects enter as parts is of a 

 more special and peculiar, or of a more 

 complicated nature, so also is the rela- 

 tion grounded upon it. And there are 

 as many conceivable relations as there 

 are conceivable kinds of facts in which 

 two things can be jointly concerned. 



In the same manner, therefore, as 

 a quality is an attribute grounded on 

 the fact that a certain sensation or 

 sensations are produced in us by the 

 object, so an attribute grounded on 

 some fact into which the object enters 

 jointly with another object, is a rela- 

 tion between it and that other object. 

 But the fact in the latter case consists 

 of the very same kind of elements as 

 the fact in the former ; namely, states 

 of consciousness. In the case, for 

 example, of any legal relation, as 

 debtor and creditor, principal and 

 agent, guardian and ward, the fun- 

 damentum relationis consists entirely 

 of thoughts, feelings, and volitions 

 (actual or contingent), either of the 

 persons themselves or of other persons 

 concerned in the same series of trans- 

 actions ; as, for instance, the inten- 

 tions which would be formed by a 

 judge, in case a complaint were made 

 to his tribunal of the infringement of 

 any of the legal obligations imposed by 

 the relation ; and the acts which the 

 judge would perform in consequence ; 

 acts being (as we have already seen) 

 another word for intentions followed 

 by an effect, and that effect being but 

 another word for sensations, or some 

 other feelings, occasioned either to the 

 agent himself or to somebody else. 

 There is no part of what the names 

 expressive of the relation imply, that 

 is not resolvable into states of con- 

 sciousness ; outward objects being, no 

 doubt, supposed throughout as the 

 causes by which some of those states 

 of consciousness are excited, and 

 minds as the subjects by which all of 

 them are experienced, but neither the 

 external objects nor the minds making 

 their existence known otherwise than 

 by the states of consciousness. 



