44 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



Oases of relation are not always so 

 complicated as those to which we last 

 alluded. The simplest of all cases of 

 relation are those expressed by the 

 words antecedent and consequent, 

 and by the word simultaneous. If 

 we say, for instance, that dawn pre- 

 ceded sunrise, the fact in which the 

 two things, dawn and sunrise, were 

 jointly concerned, consisted only of 

 the two things themselves ; no third 

 thing entered into the fact or pheno- 

 menon at all. Unless, indeed, we 

 choose to call the succession of the 

 two objects a third thing ; but their 

 succession is not something added to 

 the things themselves ; it is something 

 involved in them. Dawn and sunrise 

 announce themselves to our conscious- 

 ness by two successive sensations. 

 Our consciousness of the succession 

 of these sensations is not a third sen- 

 sation or feeling added to them ; we 

 have not first the two feelings, and 

 then a feeling of their succession. To 

 have two feelings at all, implies hav- 

 ing them either successively, or else 

 simultaneously. Sensations, or other 

 feelings, being given, succession and 

 simultaneousness are the two condi- 

 tions, to the alternative of which they 

 are subjected by the nature of our 

 faculties ; and no one has been able, 

 or needs expect, to analyse the matter 

 any farther. 



§ II. In a somewhat similar posi- 

 tion are two other sorts of relations, 

 Likeness and TJnlikeness. I have 

 two sensations ; we will suppose them 

 to be simple ones ; two sensations of 

 white, or one sensation of white and 

 another of black. I call the first two 

 sensations like ; the last two unlike. 

 What is the fact or phenomenon con- 

 stituting the fundamentum of this 

 relation ? The two sensations first, 

 and then what we call a feeling of 

 resemblance, or of want of resem- 

 blance. Let us confine ourselves to 

 the former case. Resemblance is evi- 

 dently a feeling ; a state of the con- 

 sciousness of the observer. Whether 

 the feeling of the resemblance of the 



two colours be a third state of con- 

 sciousness, which I have after having 

 the two sensations of colour, or whether 

 (like the feeling of their succession) 

 it is involved in the sensations them- 

 selves, may be a matter of discussion. 

 But in either case, these feelings of 

 resemblance, and of its opposite dis- 

 similarity, are parts of our nature ; 

 and parts so far from being capable of 

 analysis, that they are pre-supposed 

 in every attempt to analyse any of our 

 other feelings. Likeness and unlike- 

 ness, therefore, as well as antecedence, 

 sequence, and simultaneousness, must 

 stand apart among relations, as things 

 sui generis. They are attributes 

 grounded on facts, that is, on states 

 of consciousness, but on states which 

 are peculiar, unresolvable, and inex- 

 plicable. 



But, though likeness or unlikeness 

 cannot be resolved into anything else, 

 complex cases of likeness or unlikeness 

 can be resolved into simpler ones. 

 When we say of two things which 

 consist of parts, that they are like one 

 another, the likeness of the wholes 

 does admit of analysis ; it is com- 

 pounded of likenesses between the 

 various parts respectively, and of like- 

 ness in their arrangement. Of how 

 vast a variety of resemblances of parts 

 must that resemblance be composed, 

 which induces us to say that a portrait, 

 or a landscape, is like its original. If 

 one person mimics another with any 

 success, of how many simple like- 

 nesses must the general or complex 

 likeness be compounded : likeness in 

 a succession of bodily postures ; like- 

 ness in voice, or in the accents and 

 intonations of the voice ; likeness in 

 the choice of words, and in the 

 thoughts or sentiments expressed, 

 whether by word, countenance, or 

 gesture. 



All likeness and unlikeness of which 

 we have any cognizance, resolve them- 

 selves into likeness and unlikeness 

 between states of our own, or some 

 other, mind. When we say that one 

 body is like another, (since we know 

 nothing of bodies but the sensations 



