THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



45 



which they excite,) we mean really 

 that there is a resemblance between 

 the sensations excited by the two 

 bodies, or between some portions at 

 least of those sensations. If we say 

 that two attributes are like one another, 

 (since we know nothing of attributes 

 except the sensations or states of feel- 

 ing on which they are grounded,) we 

 mean really that those sensations, or 

 states of feeling, resemble each other. 

 We may also say that two relations 

 are alike. The fact of resemblance 

 between relations is sometimes called 

 analogy, forming one of the numerous 

 meanings of that word. The relation 

 in which Priam stood to Hector, 

 namely, that of father and son, re- 

 sembles the relation in which Philip 

 stood to Alexander ; resembles it so 

 closely that they are called the same 

 relati(m. The relation in which 

 Cromwell stood to England resembles 

 the relation in which Napoleon stood 

 to France, though not so closely as to 

 be called the same relation. The 

 meaning in both these instances must 

 be, that a resemblance existed between 

 the facts which constituted the funda- 

 mentum relationis. 



This resemblance may exist in all 

 conceivable gradations, from perfect 

 undistinguishableness to something 

 extremely slight. When we say, that 

 a thought suggested to the mind of a 

 person of genius is like a seed cast into 

 the ground because the former pro- 

 duces a multitude of other thoughts, 

 and the latter a multitude of other 

 seeds, this is saying that between the 

 relation of an inventive mind to a 

 thought contained in it, and the rela- 

 tion of a fertile soil to a seed contained 

 in it, there exists a resemblance : the 

 real resemblance being in the two 

 fundamerda relationis, in each of which 

 there occurs a germ, producing by its 

 development a multitude of other 

 things similar to itself. And as, 

 whenever two objects are jointly con- 

 cerned in a phenomenon, this consti- 

 tutes a relation between those objects, 

 so, if we suppose a second pair of 

 objects concerned in a second pheno- 



menon, the slightest resemblance be- 

 tween the two phenomena is suflBcient 

 to admit of its being said that the 

 two relations resemble ; provided, of 

 course, the points of resemblance are 

 found in those portions of the two 

 phenomena respectively which are 

 connoted by the relative names. 



While speaking of resem.blance, it 

 is necessary to take notice of an 

 ambiguity of language, against which 

 scarcely any one is sufficiently on his 

 guard. Resemblance, when it exists 

 in the highest degree of all, amounting 

 to'undistinguishableness, is often called 

 identity, and the two similar things 

 are said to be the same. I say often, 

 not always ; for we do not say that two 

 visible objects, two persons for in- 

 stance, are the same, because they are 

 so much alike that one might be mis- 

 taken for the other : but we constantly 

 use this mode of expression when 

 speaking of feeling ; as when I say 

 that the sight of any object gives me 

 the same sensation or emotion to- day 

 that it did yesterday, or the same 

 which it gives to some other person. 

 This is evidently an incorrect appli- 

 cation of the word same; for the 

 feeling which I had yesterday is 

 gone, never to return ; what I have 

 to-day is another feeling, exactly like 

 the former perhaps, but distinct from 

 it ; and it is evident that two different 

 persons cannot be experiencing the 

 same feeling, in the sense in which 

 we say that they are both sitting at 

 the same table. By a similar am- 

 biguity we say, that two persons are 

 ill of the same disease ; that two 

 persons hold the same ofBce ; not in 

 the sense in which we say that they 

 are engaged in the same adventure, 

 or sailing in the same ship, but in the 

 sense that they fill offices exactly 

 similar, though, perhaps, in distant 

 places. Great confusion of ideas is 

 often produced, and many fallacies 

 engendered, in otherwise enlightened 

 understandings, by not being suffi- 

 ciently alive to the fact, (in itself not 

 always to be avoided,) that they use 

 the same name to express ideas sq 



