THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 



47 



sations. And the same general ex- 

 planation has been found to apply to 

 most of the attributes usually classed 

 under the head of Relation. They, 

 too, are grounded on some fact or 

 phenomenon into which the related 

 objects enter as parts ; that fact or 

 phenomenon having no meaning and 

 no existence to us, except the series of 

 sensations or other states of conscious- 

 ness by which it makes itself known ; 

 and the relation being simply the 

 power or capacity which the object 

 posgesses of taking part along with 

 the correlated object in the production 

 of that series of sensations or states 

 of consciousness. We have been 

 obliged indeed, to recognise a some- 

 what different character in certain 

 peculiar relations, those of succession 

 and simultaneity, of likeness and un- 

 likeness. These, not being grounded 

 on any fact or phenomenon distinct 

 from the related objects themselves, 

 do not admit of the same kind of 

 analysis. But these relations, though 

 not, like other relations, grounded on 

 states of consciousness, are themselves 

 states of consciousness : resemblance 

 is nothing but our feeling of resem- 

 blance ; succession is nothing but our 

 feeling of succession. Or, if this be 

 disputed, (and we cannot, without 

 transgressing the bounds of our 

 science, discuss it here,) at least our 

 knowledge of these relations, and even 

 our possibility of knowledge, is con- 

 fined to those which subsist between 

 sensations, or other states of con- 

 sciousness ; for, though we ascribe 

 resemblance, or succession, or simul- 

 taneity, to objects and to attributes, 

 it is always in virtue of resemblance 

 or succession or simultaneity in the 

 sensations or states of consciousness 

 which those objects excite, and on 

 which those attributes are grounded. 



§ 14. In the preceding investigation 

 we have, for the sake of simplicity, 

 considered bodies only, and omitted 

 minds. But what we have said is 

 applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the 

 latter. The attributes of minds, as 



well as those of bodies, are grounded 

 on states of feeling or consciousness. 

 But in the case of a miiid, we have to 

 consider its own states, as well as 

 those which it produces in other 

 minds. Every attribute of a mind 

 consists either in being itself affected 

 in a certain way, or affecting other 

 minds in a certain way. Considered 

 in itself, we can predicate nothing of 

 it but the series of its own feelings. 

 When we say of any mind, that it is 

 devout, or superstitious, or meditative, 

 or cheerful, we mean that the ideas, 

 emotions, or volitions implied in those 

 words, form a frequently recurring 

 part of the series of feelings, or states 

 of consciousness, which fill up the 

 sentient existence of that mind. 



In addition, however, to those attri- 

 butes of a mind which are grounded 

 on its own states of feeling, attributes 

 may also be ascribed to it, in the same 

 manner as to a body, grounded on the 

 feelings which it excites in other 

 minds. A mind does not, indeed, 

 like a body, excite sensations, but it 

 may excite thoughts or emotions. 

 The most important example of attri- 

 butes ascribed on this ground, is the 

 employment of terms expressive of 

 approbation or blame. When, for 

 example, we say of any character, or 

 (in other words) of any mind, that it 

 is admirable, we mean that the con- 

 templation of it excites the sentiment 

 of admiration ; and indeed somewhat 

 more, for the word implies that we 

 not only feel admiration, but approve 

 that sentiment in ourselves. In some 

 cases, under the semblance of a single 

 attribute, two are really predicated : 

 one of them, a state of the mind it- 

 self; the other, a state with which 

 other minds are affected by thinking 

 of it. As when we say of any one 

 that he is generous. The word gene- 

 rosity expresses a certain state of mind, 

 but being a term of praise, it also ex- 

 presses that this state of mind excites 

 in us another mental state, called 

 approbation. The assertion made, 

 therefore, is twofold, and of the fol- 

 lowing purport : Certain feelings form 



