so 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



fulfilled by the word is, when an 

 affirmation is intended, is not, when 

 a negation ; or by some other part of 

 the verb to be. The word which thus 

 serves the purpose of a sign of predica- 

 tion is called, as we formerly observed, 

 the copula. It is important that there 

 should be no indistinctness in our 

 conception of the nature and office 

 of the copula ; for confused notions 

 respecting it are among the causes 

 which have spread mysticism over 

 the field of logic, and perverted its 

 speculations into logomachies. 



It is apt to be supposed that the 

 copula is something more than a 

 mere sign of predication ; that it also 

 signifies existence. In the proposi- 

 tion, Socrates is just, it may seem to 

 be implied not only that the quality 

 just can be affirmed of Socrates, but 

 moreover that Socrates is, that is to 

 say, exists. This, however, only shows 

 that there is an ambiguity in the word 

 is ; a word which not only performs 

 the function of the copula in affirma- 

 tions, but has also a meaning of its 

 own, in virtue of which it may itself 

 be made the predicate of a proposi- 

 tion. That the employment of it as 

 a copula does not necessarily include 

 the affirmation of existence, appears 

 from such a proposition as this : A 

 centaur is a fiction of the poets ; where 

 it cannot possibly be implied that a 

 centaur exists, since the proposition 

 itself expressly asserts that the thing 

 has no real existence. 



Many volumes might be filled with 

 the frivolous speculations concerning 

 the nature of Being, (tto 6v, ovaia. 

 Ens, Entitas, Essentia, and the like,) 

 which have arisen from overlooking 

 this double meaning of the word to 

 he; from supposing that when it 

 signifies to exist, and when it signifies 

 to he some specified thing, as to he a 

 man, to he Socrates, to he seen or 

 spoken of, io he a phantom, even to 

 he a nonentity, it must still, at bottom, 

 answer to the same idea ; and that a 

 meaning must be found for it which 

 shall suit all these cases. The fog 

 '\yhich rose from this narrow spot 



diffused itself at an early period over 

 the whole surface of metaphysics. 

 Yet it becomes us nOt to triumph 

 over the great intellects of Plato and 

 Aristotle because we are now able to 

 preserve ourselves from many errors 

 into which they, perhaps inevitably, 

 fell. The fire-teazer of a modem 

 steam-engine produces by his exer- 

 tions far greater effects than Milo 

 of Crotona could, but he is not there- 

 fore a stronger man. The Greeks 

 seldom knew .any language but their 

 own. This rendered it far more 

 difficult for them than it is for us, to 

 acquire a readiness in detecting 

 ambiguities. One of the advantages 

 of having accurately studied a plurality 

 of languages, especially of those 

 languages which eminent thinkers 

 have used as the vehicle of their 

 thoughts, is the practical lesson we 

 learn respecting the ambiguities of 

 words, by finding that the same word 

 in one language corresponds, on dif- 

 ferent occasions, to different words in 

 another. When not thus exercised, 

 even the strongest understandings find 

 it difficult to believe that things which 

 have a common name have not in 

 some respect or other a common 

 nature ; and often expend much 

 labour very unprofitably (as was 

 frequently done by the two philo- 

 sophers just mentioned) in vain 

 attempts to discover in what this 

 common nature consists. But, the 

 habit once formed, intellects much 

 inferior are capable of detecting even 

 ambiguities which are common to 

 many languages : and it is surprising 

 that the one now under consideration, 

 though it exists in the modern lan- 

 guages as well as in the ancient, 

 should have been overlooked by 

 almost all authors. The quantity of 

 futile speculation which had been 

 caused by a misapprehension of the 

 nature of the copula was hinted at by 

 Hobbes ; but Mr. James Mill * was, 

 I believe, the first who distinctly 

 characterized the ambiguity, and 



* Analysis of the Human Mind, i. 126 et 

 seq. 



