64 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



§ 5. We have already proceeded 

 far enough, not only to demonstrate 

 the error of Hobbes, but to ascertain 

 the real import of by far the most 

 numerous class of propositions. The 

 object of belief in a proposition, when 

 it asserts anything more than the 

 meaning of words, is generally, as in 

 the cases which we have examined, 

 either the co-existence or the sequence 

 of two phenomena. At the very com- 

 mencement of our inquiry, we found 

 that every act of belief implied two 

 Things : we have now ascertained 

 what, in the most frequent case, these 

 two things are, namely, two Pheno- 

 mena, in other words, two states of 

 consciousness ; and what it is which 

 the proposition affirms (or denies) to 

 subsist between them, namely, either 

 succession or co-existence. And this 

 case includes innumerable instances 

 which no one, previous to reflection, 

 would think of referring to it. Take 

 the following example : A generous 

 person is worthy of honour. Who 

 would expect to recognise here a case 

 of co-existence between phenomena ? 

 But so it is. The attribute which 

 causes a person to be termed generous, 

 is ascribed to him on the ground of 

 states of his mind and particulars of 

 his conduct ; both are phenomena : 

 the former are facts of internal con- 

 sciousness ; the latter, so far as dis- 

 tinct from the former, are phj'sical 

 facts, or perceptions of the senses. 

 Worthy of honour admits of a similar 

 analysis. Honour, as here used, 

 means a state of approving and 

 admiring emotion, followed on occa- 

 sion by corresponding outward acts. 

 " Worthy of honour " connotes all 

 this, together with our approval of 

 the act of showing honour. All these 

 are phenomena; states of internal con- 

 sciousness, accompanied or followed 

 by physical facts. When we say, A 

 generous person is worthy of honour, 

 we affirm co existence between the 

 two complicated phenomena connoted 

 by the two terms respectively. We 

 affirm, that wherever and whenever 

 the inward feelings and outward facts 



implied in the word generosity have 

 place, then and there the existence 

 and manifestation of an inward feel- 

 ing, honour, would be followed in our 

 minds by another inward feeling, 

 approval. 



After the analysis, in a former 

 chapter, of the import of names, 

 many examples are not needed to 

 illustrate the import of propositions. 

 When there is any obscurity or dif- 

 ficulty, it does not lie in the mean- 

 ing of the proposition, but in the 

 meaning of the names which compose 

 it ; in the extremely complicated con- 

 notation of many words ; the immense 

 multitude and prolonged series of 

 facts which often constitute the phe- 

 nomenon connoted by a name. But 

 where it is seen what the phenome- 

 non is, there is seldom any difficulty 

 in seeing that the assertion conveyed 

 by the proposition is, the co-existence 

 of one such phenomenon with another ; 

 or the succession of one such pheno- 

 menon to another : so that where the 

 one is found, we may calculate on 

 finding the other, though perhaps not 

 conversely. 



This, however, though the most 

 common, is not the only meaning 

 which propositions are ever intended 

 to convey. In the first place, 

 sequences and co-existences are not 

 only asserted respecting Phenomena ; 

 we make propositions also respecting 

 those hidden causes of phenomena, 

 which are named substances and 

 attributes. A substance, however, 

 being to us nothing but either that 

 which causes, or that which is con- 

 scious of, phenomena ; and the same 

 being true, mutatis mutandis, of attri- 

 butes ; no assertion can be made, 

 at least with a meaning, concern- 

 ing these unknown and unknowable 

 entities, except in virtue of the 

 Phenomena by which alone they 

 manifest themselves to our faculties. 

 When we say, Socrates was contem- 

 porary with the Peloponnesian war, 

 the foundation of this assertion, as of 

 all assertions concerning substances, 

 is an assertion concerning the pheno- 



