66 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



a fifth, Resemblance. This was a 

 species of attribute which we found 

 it impossible to analyse ; for which 

 no fundamentum, distinct from the 

 objects themselves, could be assigned. 

 Besides propositions which assert a 

 sequence or co-existence between two 

 phenomena, there are therefore also 

 propositions which assert resemblance 

 between them ; as, This colour is like 

 that colour ; — The heat of to-day is 

 equal to the heat of yesterday. It is 

 true that such an assertion might 

 with some plausibility be brought 

 within the description of an affirma- 

 tion of sequence, by considering it as 

 an assertion that the simultaneous 

 contemplation of the two colours is 

 followed by a specific feeling termed 

 the feeling of resemblance. But there 

 would be nothing gained by encum- 

 bering ourselves, especially in this 

 place, with a generalisation which 

 may be looked upon as strained. 

 Logic does not undertake to analyse 

 mental facts into their ultimate ele- 

 ments. Resemblance between two 

 phenomena is more intelligible in 

 itself than any explanation could 

 make it, and under any classification 

 must remain specifically distinct from 

 the ordinary cases of sequence and 

 co-existence. 



It is sometimes said, that all pro- 

 positions whatever, of which the pre- 

 dicate is a general name, do, in point 

 of fact, affirm or deny resemblance. 

 All sTich propositions affirm that a 

 thing belongs to a class ; but things 

 being classed together according to 

 their resemblance, everything is of 

 course classed with the things which 

 it is supposed to resemble most ; and 

 thence, it may be said, when we affirm 

 that Gold is a metal, or that Socrates 

 is a man, the affirmation intended is, 

 that gold resembles other metals, and 

 Socrates other men, more nearly than 

 they resemble the objects contained 

 in any other of the classes co-ordinate 

 with these. 



There is some slight degree of 

 foundation for this remark, but no 

 more than a slight degree. The 



arrangement of things into classes, 

 such as the class metal, or the class 

 mun, is grounded indeed on a resem- 

 blance among the things which are 

 placed in the same class, but not on a 

 mere general resemblance : the resem- 

 blance it is grounded on consists in 

 the possession by all those things of 

 certain common peculiarities ; and 

 those peculiarities it is which the 

 terms connote, and which the propo- 

 sitions consequently assert ; not the 

 resemblance. For though when I 

 say. Gold is a metal, I say by impli- 

 cation that if there be any other 

 metals it must resemble them, yet if 

 there were no other metals I might 

 still assert the proposition with the 

 same meaning as at present, namely, 

 that gold has the various properties 

 iii\plied in the word metal ; just as it 

 might be said. Christians are men, 

 even if there were no men who were 

 not Christians. Propositions, there- 

 fore, in which objects are referred to 

 a class, because they possess the 

 attributes constituting the class, are 

 so far from asserting nothing but 

 resemblance, that they do not, pro- 

 perly speaking, assert resemblance 

 atalL 



But we remarked some time ago 

 (and the reasons of the remark will be 

 more fully entered into in a subse- 

 quent Book*) that there is some- 

 times a convenience in extending the 

 boundaries of a class so as to include 

 things which possess in a very inferior 

 degree, if in any, some of the char- 

 a<;teristic properties of the class, — 

 provided they resemble that class 

 more than any other, insomuch that 

 the general propositions which are 

 true of the class will be nearer to 

 being true of those things than any 

 other equally general propositions. 

 For instance, there are substances 

 called metals which have very few of 

 the properties by which metals are 

 commonly recognised ; and almost 

 every great family of plants or ani- 

 mals has a few anomalous genera or 



* Book iv. cb. Tii. 



