. IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 



67 



gpecies on its borders, which are 

 admitted into it by a sort of courtesy, 

 and concerning which it has been 

 matter of discussion to what family 

 they properly belonged. Now when 

 the class-name is predicated of any 

 object of this description, we do, by 

 so predicating it, affirm resemblance 

 and nothing more. And in order to 

 be scrupulously correct, it ought to be 

 said, that in every case in which we 

 predicate a general name, we aflBrm, 

 not absolutely that the object possesses 

 the properties designated by the 

 name, but that it either possesses 

 those properties, or, if it does not, at 

 any rate resembles the things which 

 do so, more than it resembles any 

 other things. In most cases, however, 

 it is unnecessary to suppose any such 

 alternative, the latter of the two 

 grounds being very seldom that on 

 which the assertion is made : and 

 when it is, there is generally some 

 slight difference in the form of the 

 expression, as, This species (or genus) 

 is considered, or may be ranked, as 

 belonging to such and such a family : 

 we should hardly say positively that 

 it does belong to it, unless it possessed 

 unequivocally the properties of which 

 the class-name is scientifically signi- 

 ficant. 



There is still another exceptional 

 case, in which, though the predicate 

 is the name of a class, yet in predicat- 

 ing it we affirm nothing but resem- 

 blance, the class being founded not 

 on resemblance in any given parti- 

 cular, but on general unanalysable 

 resemblance. The classes in ques- 

 tion are those into which our simple 

 sensations, or rather simple feelings, 

 are divided. Sensations of white, for 

 instance, are classed together, not 

 because we can take them to pieces, 

 and say they are alike in this, and not 

 alike in that, but because we feel 

 them to be alike altogether, though 

 in different degrees. When, there- 

 fore, I say. The colour I saw yesterday 

 was a white colour, or, The sensation 

 I feel is one of tightness, in both 

 cases the attribute I afGj^ of the 



colour or of the other sensation is 

 mere resemblance — simple likeness to 

 sensations which I have had before, 

 and which have had those names 

 bestowed upon them. The names 

 of feelings, like other concrete general 

 names, are connotative ; but they 

 connote a mere resemblance. When 

 predicated of any individual feeling, 

 the information they convey is that 

 of its likeness to the other feelings 

 which we have been accustomed to 

 call by the same name. Thus much 

 may suffice in illustration of the kind 

 of propositions in which the matter- 

 of-fact asserted (or denied) is simple 

 Resemblance, 



Existence, Co-existence, Sequence, 

 Causation, Resemblance : one or 

 other of these is asserted (or denied) 

 in every proposition which is not 

 merely verbal. This fivefold division 

 is an exhaustive classification of 

 matters-of-fact ; of all things that 

 can be believed or tendered for be- 

 lief ; of all questions that can be pro- 

 pounded, and all answers that can be 

 returned to them. 



Professor Bain* distinguishes two 

 kinds of Propositions of Co-existence. 

 " In the one kind, account is taken 

 of Place ; they may be described as 

 propositions of Order in Place." In 

 the other kind, the co-existence which 

 is predicated is termed by Mr. Bain 

 Coinherence of Attributes. "This 

 is a distinct variety of Propositions of 

 Co-existence. Instead of an arrange- 

 ment in place with numerical inter- 

 vals, we have the concurrence of two 

 or more attributes or powers in the 

 same part or locality. A mass of 

 gold contains, in every atom, the con- 

 curring attributes that mark the 

 substance — weight, hardness, colour, 

 lustre, incorrosibility, &c. An animal, 

 besides having parts situated in place, 

 has coinhering functions in the same 

 parts, exerted by the very same 

 masses and molecules of its substance. 

 . . . . The Mind, which affords no 

 Propositions of Order in Place, hag 



* logic, 1. 103-X05. 



