68 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



coinhering functions. We aflSrni 

 mind to contain Feeling, Will, and 

 Thought, not in local separation, but 

 in commingling exercise. The concur- 

 ring properties of minerals, of plants, 

 and of the bodily and the mental 

 structure of animals, are united in 

 affirmations of coinherence. " 



The distinction is real and impor- 

 tant. But, as has been seen, an 

 Attribute, when it is anything but a 

 simple unanalysable Resemblance be- 

 tween the subject and some other 

 things, consists in causing impres- 

 sions of some sort on consciousness. 

 Consequently, the coinherence of two 

 attributes is but the co-existence of 

 the two states of consciousness im- 

 plied in their meaning : with the 

 difference, however, that this co-exis- 

 tence is sometimes potential only, 

 the attribute being considered as in 

 existence though the fact on which 

 it is grounded may not be actually, 

 but only potentially present. Snow, 

 for instance, is, with great conveni- 

 ence, said to be white even in a state 

 of total darkness, because, though we 

 are not now conscious of the colour, 

 we shall be conscious of it as soon as 

 morning breaks. Coinherence of at- 

 tributes is therefore still a case, though 

 a complex one, of co-existence of states 

 of consciousness : a totally different 

 thing, however, from Order in Place. 

 Being a part of simultaneity, it be- 

 longs not to Place but to Time. 



We may, therefore, (and we shall 

 sometimes find it a convenience,) in- 

 stead of Co-existence and Sequence, 

 say, for greater particularity, Order 

 in Place and Order in Time : Order 

 in Place being a specific mode of co- 

 existence, not necessary to be more 

 particularly analysed here ; while the 

 mere fact of co-existence, whether be- 

 tween actual sensations, or between 

 the potentialities of causing them, 

 known by the name of attributes, may 

 be classed, together with Sequence, 

 under the head of Order in Time. 



§ 7. In the foregoing inquiry into 

 ^e import of Propositions, we have 



thought it necessary to analyse 

 directly those alone, in which the 

 terms of the proposition (or the pre- 

 dicate at least) are concrete terms. 

 But, in doing so, we have indirectly 

 analysed those in which the terms are 

 abstract. The distinction between an 

 abstract term and its corresponding 

 concrete, does not turn upon any dif- 

 ference in what they are appointed to 

 signify ; for the real signification of a 

 concrete general name is, as we have 

 so often said, its connotation ; and 

 what the concrete term connotes forms 

 the entire meaning of the abstract 

 name. Since there is nothing in the 

 import of an abstract name which is 

 not in the import of the correspond- 

 ing concrete, it is natural to suppose 

 that neither can there be anything in 

 the import of a proposition of which 

 the terms are abstract, but what there 

 is in some proposition which can b« 

 framed of concrete terms. 



And this presumption a closer exa- 

 mination will confirm. An abstract 

 name is the name of an attribute, or 

 combination of attributes. The cor- 

 responding concrete is a name given 

 to things, because of, and in order to 

 express, their possessing that attribute, 

 or that combination of attributes. 

 When, therefore, we predicate of any- 

 thing a concrete name, the attribute 

 is what we in reality predicate of it. 

 But it has now been shown that in all 

 propositions of which the predicate 

 is a concrete name, what is really 

 predicated is one of five things : 

 Existence, Co-existence, Causation, 

 Sequence, or Resemblance. An at- 

 tribute, therefore, is necessarily either 

 an existence, a co-existence, a causa- 

 tion, a sequence, or a resemblance. 

 When a proposition consists of a sub- 

 ject and predicate which are abstract 

 terms, it consists of terms which must 

 necessarily signify one or other of these 

 things. When we predicate of any- 

 thing an abstract name, we affirm of the 

 thing that it is one or other of these five 

 things ; that it is a case of Existence, 

 or of Co-existence, or of Causation, 

 or of Sequence, or of Resenablj^nce, 



