IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 



69 



It is impossible to imagine any pro- 

 position expressed in abstract terms, 

 which cannot be transformed into a 

 precisely equivalent proposition in 

 which the terms are concrete ; namely, 

 either the concrete names which con- 

 note the attributes themselves, or the 

 names of the fundamenta of those 

 attributes ; the facts or phenomena on 

 which they are grounded. To illus- 

 trate the latter case, let us take this 

 proposition, of which the subject only 

 is an abstract name, '* Thoughtlessness 

 is dangerous." Thoughtlessness is 

 an attribute, grounded on the facts 

 which we call thoughtless actions ; and 

 the proposition is equivalent to this, 

 Thoughtless actions are dangerous. 

 In the next example the predicate as 

 well as the subject are abstract names: 

 " Whiteness is a colour ; " or " The 

 colour of snow is a whiteness." These 

 attributes being grounded on sensa- 

 tions, the equivalent propositions in 

 the concrete would be. The sensation 

 of white is one of the sensations called 

 those of colour, — The sensation of 

 sight, caused by looking at snow, is 

 one of the sensations called sensations 

 of white. In these propositions, as 

 we have before seen, the matter-of- 

 fact asserted is a Resemblance. In 

 the following examples, the concrete 

 terms are those which directly corre- 

 spond to the abstract names ; connot- 

 ing the attribute which these denote. 

 " Prudence is a virtue : " this may 

 be rendered, '* All prudent persons, 

 in so far as prudent, are virtuous : " 

 " Courage is deserving of honour," 

 thus, " All courageous persons are 

 deserving of honour in so far as they 

 are courageous : " which is equivalent 

 to this — " All courageous persons de- 

 serve an addition to the honour, or a 

 diminution of the disgrace, which 

 would attach to them on other 

 grounds." 



In order to throw still further light 

 upon the import of propositions of 

 which the terms are abstract, we will 

 subject one of the examples given 

 above to a minuter analysis. The 

 proposition we shall select is the fol- 



lowing : — " Prudence is a virtue." 

 Let us substitute for the word virtue 

 an equivalent but more definite ex- 

 pression, such as "a mental quality 

 beneficial to society," or " a mental 

 quality pleasing to God, "or whatever 

 else we adopt as the definition of 

 virtue. What the proposition asserts 

 is a sequence, accompanied with causa- 

 tion : namely, that benefit to society, 

 or that the approval of God, is conse- 

 quent on, and caused by, prudence. 

 Here is a sequence ; but between 

 what ? We understand the conse- 

 quent of the sequence, but we have 

 yet to analyse the antecedent. Pru- 

 dence is an attribute ; and, in con- 

 nection with it, two things besides it- 

 self are to be considered ; prudent 

 persons, who are the subjects of the 

 attribute, and prudential conduct, 

 which ma}' be called the foundation 

 of it. Now is either of these the 

 antecedent ? and, first, is it meant 

 that the approval of God, or benefit 

 to society, is attendant upon all pru- 

 dent persons ? No, except in so far 

 as they are prudent ; for prudent per- 

 sons who are scoundrels can seldom 

 on the whole be beneficial to society, 

 nor can they be acceptable to a good 

 being. Is it upon prudential conduct, 

 then, that divine approbation and 

 benefit to mankind are supposed to 

 be invariably consequent ? Neither is 

 this the assertion meant, when it is 

 said that prudence is a virtue ; except 

 with the same reservation as before, 

 and for the same reason, namely, that 

 prudential conduct, although in so far 

 as it is beneficial to society, may yet, 

 by reason of some other of its quali- 

 ties, be productive of an injury out- 

 weighing the benefit, and deserve a 

 displeasure exceeding the approbation 

 which would be due to the prudence. 

 Neither the substance, therefore, (viz, 

 the person,) nor the phenomenon, (the 

 conduct,) is an antecedent on which 

 the other term of the sequence is 

 universally consequent. But the pro- 

 position, " Prudence is a virtue," is 

 an universal proposition. What is 

 it, then, upon which the proposition 



