70 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



affirms the effects in question to be 

 universally consequent ? Upon that 

 in the person, and in the conduct, 

 which causes them to be called pru- 

 dent, and which is equally in them 

 when the action, though prudent, is 

 wicked ; namely, a correct foresight 

 of consequences, a just estimation of 

 their importance to the object in view, 

 and repression of any unreflecting 

 impulse at variance with the deliber- 

 ate purpose. These, which are states 

 of the person's mind, are the real 

 antecedent in the sequence, the real 

 cause in the causation, asserted by 

 the proposition. But these are also 

 the real ground, or foundation, of the 

 attribute Prudence ; since wherever 

 these states of mind exist we may 

 predicate prudence, even before we 

 know whether any conduct has fol- 

 lowed. And in this manner every 

 assertion respecting an attribute may 

 be transformed into an assertion 

 exactly equivalent respecting the fact 

 or plienomenon which is the ground 

 of the attribute. And no case can be 

 assigned, where that which is predi- 

 cated of the fact or phenomenon does 

 not belong to one or other of the five 

 species formerly enumerated : it is 

 either simple Existence, or it is some 

 Sequence, Co-existence, Causation, or 

 Resemblance. 



And as these five are the only things 

 which can be affirmed, so are they the 

 only things which can be denied. " No 

 horses are web-footed," denies that 

 the attributes of a horse ever co-exist 

 with web-feet. It is scarcely neces- 

 sary to apply the same analysis to 

 particular affirmations and negations. 

 " Some birds are web-footed," affirms 

 that, with the attributes connoted by 

 bird, the phenomenon web-feet is 

 sometimes co-existent : " Some birds 

 are not web- footed," asserts that there 

 are other instances in which this co- 

 existence does not have place. Any 

 further explanation of a thing which, 

 if the previous exposition has been 

 assented to, is so obvious, may here 

 be spared. 



CHAPTER Vt 



OF PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL. 



§ I. As a preparation for the in- 

 quiry which is the proper object of 

 Logic, namely, in what manner pro- 

 positions are to be proved, we have 

 found it necessary to inquire what 

 they contain which requires, or is 

 susceptible of, proof ; or (which is the 

 same thing) what they assert. In the 

 course of this preliminary investiga- 

 tion into the import of Propositions, 

 we examined the opinion of the Con- 

 ceptualists, that a proposition is the 

 expression of a relation between two 

 ideas ; and the doctrine of the extreme 

 Nominalists, that it is the expression 

 of an agreement or disagreement be- 

 tween the meanings of two names. 

 We decided that, as general theories, 

 both of these are erroneous ; and that, 

 though propositions may be made 

 both respecting names and respecting 

 ideas, neither the one nor the other 

 are the subject-matter of Propositions 

 considered generally. We then exa- 

 mined the different kinds of Propo- 

 sitions, and found that, with the 

 exception of those which are merely 

 verbal, they assert five different kinds 

 of matters of fact, namely. Existence, 

 Order in Place, Order in Time, Causa- 

 tion, and Resemblance ; that in every 

 proposition one of these five is either 

 affirmed, or denied, of some fact or 

 phenomenon, or of some object the un- 

 known source of a fact or phenomenon. 



In distinguishing, however, the dif- 

 ferent kinds of matters of fact asserted 

 in propositions, we reserved one class 

 of propositions, which do not relate to 

 any matter of fact, in the proper sense 

 of the term, at all, but to the mean- 

 ing of names. Since names and their 

 signification are entirely arbitrary, 

 such propositions are not, strictly 

 speaking, susceptible of truth or 

 falsity, but only of conformity or 

 disconformity to usage or convention ; 

 and all the proof they are capable 

 of, is proof of usage ; proof that 

 the words have been employed by 

 others in the acceptation in which the 



