VERBAL AND REAL PROPOSITIONS. 



71 



speaker or writer desires to use them. 

 These propositions occupy, however, a 

 conspicuous place in philosophy ; and 

 their nature and characteristics are 

 of as much importance in logic, as 

 those of any of the other classes of 

 propositions previously adverted to. 



If all propositions respecting the 

 signification of words were as simple 

 and unimportant as those which 

 served us for examples when examin- 

 ing Hobbes' theory of predication, 

 viz. those of which the subject and 

 predicate are proper names, and which 

 assert only that those names have, 

 or that they have not, been conven- 

 tionally assigned to the same indivi- 

 dual, there would be little to attract 

 to such propositions the attention of 

 philosophers. But the class of merely 

 verbal propositions embraces not only 

 much more than these, but much 

 more than any propositions which at 

 first sight present themselves as ver- 

 bal ; comprehending a kind of asser- 

 tions which have been regarded not 

 only as relating to things, but as hav- 

 ing actually a more intimate relation 

 with them than any other propositions 

 whatever. The student in philosophy 

 will perceive that I allude to the dis- 

 tinction on which so much stress was 

 laid by the schoolmen, and which 

 has been retained either under the 

 same or under other names by most 

 metaphysicians to the present day, 

 viz. between what were called essen- 

 tial, and what were called accidental, 

 propositions, and between essential 

 and accidental properties or attri- 

 butes. 



§ 2. Almost all metaphysicians prior 

 to Locke, as well as many since his 

 time, have made a great mystery of 

 Essential Predication, and of predi- 

 cates which are said to be of the 

 essence of the subject. The essence of 

 a thing, they said, was that without 

 which the thing could neither be, 

 nor be conceived to be. Thus, ration- 

 ality was of the essence of man, be- 

 cause without rationality man could 

 not be conceived to exist. The dif- 



ferent attributes which made up the 

 essence of the thing were called its 

 essential properties ; and a proposi- 

 tion in which any of these were pre- 

 dicated of it was called an Essential 

 Proposition, and was considered to go 

 deeper into the nature of the thing, 

 and to convey more important infor- 

 mation respecting it than any other 

 proposition could do. All properties, 

 not of the essence of the thing, were 

 called its accidents ; were supposed 

 to have nothing at all, or nothing 

 comparatively, to do with its inmost 

 nature ; and the propositions in which 

 any of these were predicated of it 

 were called Accidental Propositions. 

 A connection may be traced between 

 this distinction, which originated 

 with the schoolmen, and the well- 

 known dogmas of substantia secundce 

 or general substances, and substantial 

 forms, doctrines which under varieties 

 of language pervaded alike the Aris- 

 totelian and the Platonic schools, and 

 of which more of the spirit has come 

 down to modem times than might be 

 conjectured from the disuse of the 

 phraseology. The false views of the 

 nature of classification and general- 

 isation which prevailed among the 

 schoolmen, and of which these dog- 

 mas were the technical expression, 

 afford the only explanation which can 

 be given of their having misunder- 

 stood the real nature of those Essences 

 which held so conspicuous a place in 

 their philosophy. They said, truly, 

 that man cannot be conceived with- 

 out rationality. But though man 

 cannot, a being may be conceived 

 exactly like a man in all points except 

 that one quality, and those others 

 which are the conditions or conse- 

 quences of it. All therefore which is 

 really true in the assertion that man 

 cannot be conceived without ration- 

 ality, is only that if he had not ration- 

 ality, he would not be reputed a man. 

 There is no impossibility in conceiv- 

 ing the thivg, nor, for aught we know, 

 in its existing : the impossibility is 

 in the conventions of language, which 

 will not allow the thing, even if it 



