VERBAL AND REAL PROPOSITIONS. 



73 



word connoting existence. The actual 

 existence of the subject of the propo- 

 sition is therefore only apparently, not 

 really, implied in the predication, if 

 an essential one : we may say, A ghost 

 is a disembodied spirit, without believ- 

 ing in ghosts. But an accidental, or 

 non-essential affirmation, does imply 

 the real existence of the subject, be- 

 cause in the case of a non-existent 

 subject there is nothing for the pro- 

 position to assert. Such a proposition 

 as. The ghost of a murdered person 

 haunts the couch of the murderer, 

 can only have a meaning if understood 

 as implying a belief in ghosts ; for 

 since the signification of the word 

 ghost implies nothing of the kind, the 

 speaker either means nothing, or means 

 to assert a thing which he wishes to 

 be believed to have really taken place. 

 It will be hereafter seen that when 

 any important consequences seem to 

 follow, as in mathematics, from an 

 essential proposition, or, in other 

 words, from a proposition involved in 

 the meaning of a name, what they 

 really flow from is the tacit assump- 

 tion of the real existence of the object 

 so named. Apart from this assump- 

 tion of real existence, the class of pro- 

 positions in which the predicate is of 

 the essence of the subject (that is, in 

 which the predicate connotes the 

 w^hole or part of what the subject con- 

 notes, but nothing besides) answer no 

 purpose but that of unfolding the whole 

 or some part of the meaning of the 

 name to those who did not previously 

 know it. Accordingly, the most use- 

 ful, and in strictness the only useful 

 kind of essential propositions, are 

 Definitions : which, to be complete, 

 should unfold the whole of what is 

 involved in the meaning of the word 

 defined ; that is, (when it is a con- 

 notative word,) the whole of what it 

 connotes. In defining a name, how- 

 ever, it is not usual to specify its 

 entire connotation, but so much only 

 as is sufficient to mark out the objects 

 usually denoted by it from all other 

 known objects. And sometimes a 

 merely accidental property, not in- 



volved in the meaning of the name, 

 answers this purpose equally well. 

 The various kinds of definition which 

 these distinctions give rise to, and the 

 puiposes to which they are respec- 

 tively subservient, will be minutely 

 considered in the proper place. 



§ 3. According to the above view 

 of essential propositions, no proposi- 

 tion can be reckoned such which re- 

 lates to an individual by name, that 

 is, in which the subject is a proper 

 name. Individuals have no essences. 

 When the schoolmen talked of the 

 essence of an individual, they did not 

 mean the properties implied in its 

 name, for the names of individuals 

 imply no properties. They regarded 

 as of the essence of an individual 

 whatever was of the essence of the 

 species in which they were accustomed 

 to place that individual ; i.e. of the 

 class to which it was most familiarly 

 referred, and to which, therefore, they 

 conceived that it by nature belonged. 

 Th\is, because the proposition Man is 

 a rational being, was an essential pro- 

 position, they affirmed the same thing 

 of the proposition, Julius Caesar is a 

 rational being. This followed very 

 naturally if genera and species were 

 to be considered as entities, distinct 

 from, but inha'ing in, the individuals 

 composing them. If man was a sub- 

 stance inhering in each individual 

 man, the essence of man (whatever 

 that might mean) was naturally sup- 

 posed to accompany it ; to inhere in 

 John Thompson, and to form the 

 common essence of Thompson and 

 Julius Caesar. It might then be fairly 

 said, that rationality, being of the 

 essence of Man, was of the essence 

 also of Thompson. But if Man alto- 

 gether be only the individual men 

 and a name bestowed upon them in 

 consequence of certain common pro- 

 perties, what becomes of John Thomp- 

 son's essence ? 



A fundamental error is seldom ex- 

 pelled from philosophy by a single 

 victory. It retreats slowly, defends 

 every inch of ground, and often, after 



