So 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



capses ; while the recognition of those 

 differences as grounds of classification 

 and of naming, is, equally in both 

 cases, the act of man : only in the 

 one case, the ends of language and of 

 classification would be subverted if no 

 notice were taken of the difference, 

 while in the other case, the necessity 

 of taking notice of it depends on the 

 importance or unimportance of the 

 particular qualities in which the dif- 

 ference happens to consist. 



Now, these classes, distinguished 

 by unknown multitudes of properties, 

 and not solely by a few determinate 

 ones — which are parted off from one 

 another by an unfathomable chasm, 

 instead of a mere ordinary ditch with 

 a visible bottom — are the only classes 

 which, by the Aristotelian logicians, 

 were considered as genera or species. 

 Differences which extended only to a 

 certain property or properties, and 

 there terminated, they considered as 

 differences only in the accidents of 

 things ; but where any class differed 

 from other things by an infinite series 

 of differences, known and unknown, 

 they considered the distinction as of 

 one kind, and spoke of it as being an 

 essential difference, which is also one 

 of the current meanings of that vague 

 expression at the present day. 



Conceiving the schoolmen to have 

 been justified in drawing a broad line 

 of separation between these two kinds 

 of classes and of class-distinctions, I 

 shall not only retain the division it- 

 self, but continue to express it in their 

 language. According to that lan- 

 guage, the proximate (or lowest) Kind 

 to which any individual is referrible, 

 is called its species. Conformably to 

 this, Isaac Newton would be said to 

 be of the species man. There are 

 indeed numerous sub-classes included 

 in the class man, to which Newton 

 also belongs ; for example, Christian, 

 and Englishman, and Mathematician. 

 But these, though distinct classes, are 

 not, in our sense of the term, distinct 

 Kinds of men. A Christian, for ex- 

 ample, differs from other human 

 beings ; but he differs only in the 



attribute which the word expresses, 

 namely, belief in Christianity, and 

 whatever else that implies, either as 

 involved in the fact itself, or con- 

 nected with it through some law of 

 cause and effect. We should never 

 think of inquiring what properties, 

 unconnected with Christianity, either 

 as cause or effect, are common to all 

 Christians and peculiar to them ; 

 while in regard to all Men, physiolo- 

 gists are perpetually carrjdng on such 

 an inquiry ; nor is the answer ever 

 likely to be completed. Man, there- 

 fore, we may call a species ; Christian, 

 or Mathematician, we cannot. 



Note here, that it is by no means 

 intended to imply that there may not 

 be different Kinds, or logical species, 

 of man. The various races and tem- 

 peraments, the two sexes, and even 

 the various ages, may be differences 

 of kind, within our meaning of the 

 term. I do not say that they are so. 

 For in the progress of physiology it 

 may almost be said to be made out, 

 that the differences which really exist 

 between different races, sexes, &c., 

 follow as consequences, under laws of 

 nature, from a small number of pri- 

 mary differences which can be pre- 

 cisely determined, and which, as the 

 phrase is, account for all the rest. If 

 this be so, these are not distinctions 

 in kind ; no more than Christian, Jew, 

 Mussulman, and Pagan, a difference 

 which also carries many consequences 

 along with it. And in this way classes 

 are often mistaken for real Kinds, 

 which are afterwards proved not to 

 be so. But if it turned out that the 

 differences were not capable of being 

 thus accounted for, then Caucasian, 

 Mongolian, Negro, &c., would be 

 really different Kinds of human be- 

 ings, and entitled to be ranked as 

 species by the logician, though not 

 by the naturalist. For (as already 

 noticed) the word species is used in a 

 different signification in logic and in 

 natural history. By the naturalist, 

 organised beings are not usually said 

 to be of different species, if it is sup- 

 posed that they have descended from 



