86 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONSL 



80 far as we are aware, they might 

 be ah ent vA-ithout making the name 

 inapplicable and the species a differ- 

 ent species— are yet never in fact 

 known to be absent. A concise mode 

 of expressing the same meaning is, 

 that inseparable accidents are pro- 

 perties which are universal to the 

 species, but not necessary to it. Thus, 

 blackness is an attribute of a crow, 

 and, as far wa know, an imiversal one. 

 B\it if we were to discover a race of 

 white birds, in other respects resem- 

 bling crows, we should not say, These 

 are not crows ; we should say, These 

 are white crows. Crow, therefore, 

 does not connote blackness ; nor, from 

 any of the attributes which it does 

 connote, whether as a word in popu- 

 lar use or as a term of art, could 

 blackness be inferred. Not only, there- 

 fore, can we conceive a white crow, 

 but we know of no reason why such 

 an animal should not exist. Since, 

 however, none but black crows are 

 known to exist, blackness, in the pre- 

 sent state of our knowledge, ranks as 

 an accident, but an inseparable acci- 

 dent, of the species crow. 



Separable Accidents are those which 

 are found, in point of fact, to be some- 

 times absent from the species ; which 

 are not only not necessary, but not 

 even universal. They are such as do 

 not belong to every individual of the 

 species, but only to some individuals ; 

 or if to all, not at all times. Thus 

 the colour of an European is one of 

 the separable accidents of the species 

 man, because it is not an attribute of 

 all human creatures. Being bom, is 

 also (speaking in the logical sense) a 

 separable accident of the species man, 

 because, though an attribute of all 

 human beings, it is so only at one 

 particular time. A fortiori those attri- 

 butes which are not constant even in 

 the same individual, as, to be in one 

 or in another place, to be hot or cold, 

 sitting or walking, must be ranked as 

 separable accidents. 



CHAPTER Vin. 



OF DEFINITION. 



§ I . One necessary part of the theory 

 of Names and of Propositions remains 

 ! to be treated of in this place : the the- 

 I ory of Definitions. As being the most 

 I important of the class of propositions 

 which we have characterised as purely 

 ! verbal, they have already received 

 some notice in the chapter preceding 

 the last. But their fuller treatment 

 was at that time postponed, because 

 definition is so closely connected with 

 classification, that, until the nature of 

 the latter process is in some measure 

 understood, the former cannot be dis- 

 cussed to much purpose. 



The simplest and most correct 

 notion of a Definition is, a proposi- 

 tion declaratory of the meaning of a 

 word ; namely, either the meaning 

 which it bears in common acceptation, 

 or that which the speaker or writer, 

 for the particular purposes of his dis- 

 course, intends to annex to it. 



The definition of a word being the 

 proposition which enunciates its mean- 

 ing, words which have no meaning are 

 unsusceptible of definition. Proper 

 names, therefore, cannot be defined. 

 A proper name being a mere mark 

 put upon an individual, and of which 

 it is the characteristic property to 

 be destitute of meaning, its meaning 

 cannot of course be declared ; though 

 we may indicate by language, as we 

 might indicate still more conveniently 

 by pointing with the finger, upon 

 what individual that particular mark 

 has been, or is intended to be. put. 

 It is no definition of "John Thom- 

 son " to say he is " the son of General 

 Thomson ;" for the name John Thom- 

 son does not express this. Neither 

 is it any definition of "John Thom- 

 son " to say he is " the man now 

 crossing the .street." These proposi- 

 tions may serve to make known who 

 is the part cular man to whom the 

 name belongs, but that may be done 

 still more unambiguously by pointing 

 to him, which, however, has not been 



