DEFINITIOK. 



8? 



esteemed one of the modes of defini- 

 tion. 



In the case of connotative names, 

 the meaning, as has been so often ob- 

 Berved, is the connotation ; and the 

 definition of a connotative name is 

 the proposition which declares its con- 

 notation. This might be done either 

 directly or indirectly. The direct 

 mode would be by a proposition in 

 this form: "Man" (or whatsoever 

 the word may be) " is a name connot- 

 ing such and such attributes," or "is 

 a name which, when predicated of 

 anything, signifies the possession of 

 such and such attributes by that 

 thing." Or thus : Man is everything 

 which possesses such and such attri- 

 butes ; Man is everything which pos- 

 sesses corporeity, organisation, life, 

 rationality, and certain peculiarities 

 of external form. 



This form of definition is the most 

 precise and least equivocal of any ; 

 but it is not brief enough, and is be- 

 sides too technical for common dis- 

 course. The more usual mode ot de- 

 claring the connotation of a name is 

 to predicate of it another name or 

 names of known signification, which 

 connote the same aggregation of attri- 

 butes. This may be done either by 

 predicating of the name intended to 

 be defined another connotative name 

 exactly synonymous, as, "Man is a 

 human being," which is not commonly 

 accounted a definition at all ; or by 

 predicating two or more connotative 

 names, which make up among them 

 the whole connotation of the name to 

 be defined. In thia last case, again, 

 we may either compose our definition 

 of as many connotative names as there 

 are attributes, each attribute being 

 connoted by one, as, Man is a corpo- 

 real, organised, animated, rational 

 being, shaped so and so ; or we may 

 employ names which connote several 

 of the attributes at once, as, Man is 

 a rational animal, shaped so and so. 



The definition of a name, according 

 to this view of it, is the sum total of 

 all the essential propositions which can 

 be framed with that name for their 



subject. All propositions the truth 

 of which is implied in the name, all 

 those which we are made aware of by 

 merely hearing the name, are included 

 in the definition, if complete, and may 

 be evolved from it without the aid of 

 any other premises ; whether the de- 

 finition expresses them in two or three 

 words, or in a larger number. It is, 

 therefore, not without reason that 

 Condillac and other writers have 

 affirmed a definition to be an analysis. 

 To resolve any complex wliole into 

 the elements of which it is com- 

 ! pounded, is the meaning of analysis ; 

 i and this we do when we replace one 

 I word which connotes a set of attri- 

 butes collectively, by two or more 

 which connote the same attributes 

 singly or in smaller groups. 



§ 2. From this, however, the ques- 

 tion naturally arises, in what mannci 

 are we to define a name which coa- 

 notes only a single attribute : for iQ- 

 stance, "'white," which connotes no- 

 thing but whiteness ; " rational," 

 which connotes nothing but the pos- 

 session of reason. It might seem that 

 the meaning of such names could only 

 be declared in two ways ; by a synony- 

 mous term, if any such can be found ; 

 or in the direct way already alluded 

 to : " White is a name connoting the 

 attribute whiteness." Let us see, 

 however, whether the analysis of the 

 meaning of the name, that is, the 

 breaking down of that meaning into 

 several parts, admits of being carried 

 farther. Without at present deciding 

 this queition as to the word white, it 

 is obvious that in the case of rational 

 some further explanation may be 

 given of its meaning than is contained 

 in the proposition, " Rational is that 

 which possesses the attribute of 

 reason ; " since the attribute reason 

 itself admits of being defined. And 

 here we must turn our attention to 

 the definitions of attributes, or rather 

 of the names of attributes, that is, of 

 abstract names. 



In regard to such names of attri- 

 butes as are connotative, and exprees 



