S8 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



attributes of those attributes, there is 

 no diJBBculty : like other eonnotative 

 names, they are defined by declaring 

 their connotation. Thus the word 

 (ault may be defined, " a quality pro- 

 ductive of evil or inconvenience." 

 Sometimes, again, the attribute to be 

 defined is not one attribute, but an 

 union of several : we have only, there- 

 fore, to put together the names of all 

 the attributes taken separately, and 

 we obtain the definition of the name 

 which belongs to them all taken to- 

 gether ; a definition which will cor- 

 respond exactly to that of the corre- 

 sponding concrete name. For, as we 

 define a concrete name by enumerat- 

 ing the attributes which it connotes, 

 and as the attributes connoted by a 

 concrete name form the entire signi- 

 fication of the corresponding abstract 

 name, the same enumeration will 

 serve for the definition of both. Thus, 

 if the definition of a human being be 

 this, " a being, corporeal, animated, 

 rational, shaped so and so," the defini- 

 tion of humanity will be corporeity 

 and animal life, combined with ration- 

 ality, and with such and such a shape. 

 When, on the other hand, the ab- 

 stract name does not express a com- 

 plication of attributes, but a single 

 attribute, we must remember that 

 every attribute is grounded on some 

 fact or phenomenon, from which, and 

 which alone, it derives its meaning. 

 To that fact or phenomenon, called in 

 a former chapter the foundation of 

 the attribute, we must, therefore, 

 have recourse for its definition. Now, 

 the foundation of the attribute may 

 be a phenomenon of any degree of 

 complexity consisting of many dif- 

 ferent parts, either co-existent or in 

 succession. To obtain a definition of 

 the attribute, we must analyse the 

 phenomenon into these parts. Elo- 

 quence, for example, is the name of 

 one attribute only ; but this attribute 

 is grounded on external effects of a 

 complicated nature, flowing from acts 

 of the person to whom we ascribe the 

 attribute ; and by resolving this pheno- 

 menon of causation into its two parts, 



the cause and the effect, we obtain Sk 

 definition of eloquence, viz. the power 

 of influencing the feelings by speech 

 or writing. 



A name, therefore, whether concrete 

 or abstract, admits of definition, pro- 

 vided we are able to analyse, that is, 

 to distinguish into parts, the attribute 

 or set of attributes which constitute 

 the meaning both of the concrete 

 name and of the corresponding ab- 

 stract : if a set of attributes, by enu- 

 merating them ; if a single attribute, 

 by dissecting the fact or phenomenon 

 (whether of perception or of internal 

 consciousness) which is the foundation 

 of the attribute. But, farther, even 

 when the fact is one of our simple 

 feelings or states of consciousness, and 

 therefore unsusceptible of analysis, 

 the names both of the object and of 

 the attribute still admit of definition : 

 or rather, would do so if all our simple 

 feelings had names. Whiteness may 

 be defined, the property or power of 

 exciting the sensation of white. A 

 white object may be defined, an 

 object which excites the sensation of 

 white. The only names which are 

 unsusceptible of definition, because 

 their meaning is unsusceptible of 

 analysis, are the names of the simple 

 feelings themselves. These are in 

 the same condition as proper names. 

 They are not indeed, like proper 

 names, unmeaning ; for the words 

 sensation of white signify, that the 

 sensation which I so denominate 

 resembles other sensations which I 

 remember to have had before, and to 

 have called by that name. But as 

 we have no words by which to recall 

 those former sensations, except the 

 very word which we seek to define, or 

 some other which, being exactly syno- 

 nymous with it, requires definition as 

 much, words cannot unfold the signi- 

 fication of this class of names ; and we 

 are obliged to make a direct appeal 

 to the personal experience of the 

 individual whom we address. 



§ 3. Having stated what seems to 

 be the true idea of a Definition, I 



