92 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



sarily connote enough of its properties 

 to fix the boundaries of the class. If 

 the definition, therefore, be a full 

 statement of the connotation, it is all 

 that a definition can be required to 

 be.* 



§ 5. Of the two incomplete and 

 popular modes of definition, and in 

 what they differ from the complete 

 or philosophical mode, enough has 

 now been said. We shall next exa- 

 mine an ancient doctrine, once gene- 

 rally prevalent, and still by no means 

 exploded, which I regard as the 

 source of a great part of the obscurity 

 hanging over some of the most impor- 

 tant processes of the understanding 



* Professor Bain, in his Logic, takes a 

 peculiar view of Definition. He holds (i. 

 71) with the present work, that "the de- 

 finition in its full import is the sum of all 

 the properties connoted by the name ; it 

 sxhausis the meaning of a word." But he 

 regards the meaning of a general name as 

 including, not indeed all the common pro- 

 perties of the class named, but all of tliem 

 that are ultimate properties not resolvable 

 into one another. " The enumeration of 

 tiie attributes of oxygen, of gold, of man, 

 should be an enumeration of the final, (so 

 far as can be made out,) the underivable, 



{)owers or functions of each," and nothing 

 ess than this is a complete Definition (i. 

 75). An independent property, not deriv- 

 able from other properties, even if previ- 

 ously unknown, yet as soon as discovered 

 becomes, according to him, part of the 

 meaning of the term, and should be in- 

 cluded in the definition. " When we are 

 told that diamond, which we know to be 

 a transparent, glittering, hard, and high- 

 priced hubstance, is composed of carbon, 

 and is combustible, we must put these 

 additional properties on the same level as 

 the rest ; to us they are henceforth con- 

 noted by the name " (i. 73). Consequently 

 the propositions that diamond is composed 

 of carbon, and that it is combustible, are 

 regarded by Mr. Bain as merely verbal 

 propositions. He cai-ries this doctrine so 

 far as to say that unless mortality can be 

 shown to be a consequence of the ultimate 

 laws of animal organisation, mortality is 

 connoted by man, and " Man is mortal " 

 is a merely verbal proposition. And one 

 of the peculiarities (I think a disadvan- 

 tageous pi culiarity)of his able and valuable 

 treatise, is the large number of proposi- 

 tions requiring proof, and learnt by ex- 

 perience, which, in conformity with this 

 doctrine, he considers as not real, taut ver- 

 bal, propositions. 



in the pursuit of truth. According 

 to this, the definitions of which we 

 have now treated are only one of two 

 sorts into which definitions may be 

 divided, viz. definitions of names, and 

 definitions of things. The former are 

 intended to explain the meaning of a 

 term ; the latter, the nature of a 

 thing ; the last being incomparably 

 the most important. 



This opinion was held by the an- 

 cient philosophers, and by their fol- 

 lowers, with the exception of the 

 Nominalists ; but as the spirit of 

 modern metaphysics, until a recent 

 period, has been on the whole a No- 

 minalist spirit, the notion of defini- 

 tions of things has been to a certain 

 extent in abeyance, still continuing, 

 however, to breed confusion in logic, 



The objection I have to this language is 

 that it confounds, or at least confuses, a 

 much more important distinction 'hanthat 

 which it draws. The only reason for divid- 

 ing Propositions into real and verbal, is in 

 order to discriminate propositions which 

 convey information about facts from those 

 which do not. A proposition which afiBrms 

 that an object has a given attribute, wliile 

 designating the object by a name which 

 already signifies the attribute, adds no 

 information to that which was already 

 possessed by all wiio understood the name. 

 But when this is said, it is implied that by 

 the signification of a name is meant the 

 signification attached to it in the common 

 usage of life. I cannot think we ought to 

 say that the meaning of a word includes 

 matters of fact which are unknown to 

 every pers^on who uses the word unless he 

 has learnt them by special study of a par- 

 ticular department of Nature; or that 

 because a few persons are aware of these 

 matters of fact, the affirmation of them is 

 a proposition conveying no information, 

 I hold that (special scientific conno; arion 

 apart) a name means, or connotes, only 

 the properties whicli it is a mark of in the 

 general mind ; and that in the case of any 

 additional properties, however uniformly 

 found to accompany these, it remains pos- 

 sible that a thing which did not possess 

 the properties might still be thought en- 

 titled to the name. Ruminant, accurding 

 to Mr. Bain's use of language, cot motes 

 cloven-hoofed, since tiie two properties are 

 always found tog^^ther, and no connection 

 has ever been discovered between them : 

 but ruminant does not mean cloven-hoofed ; 

 and were an animal to be discovered which 

 chews the cud, but has its feet undivided, 

 I venture to say that it would still be called 

 ruminant. 



