96 



NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



of a definition, are true. Therefore, 

 the premises considered as parts of a 

 definition cannot be the real ones. 

 The real premises must be — 



A dragon is a really existing thing 

 which breathes flame : 



A dragon is a really existing 

 serpent : 

 which implied premises being false, 

 the falsity of the conclusion presents 

 no absurdity. 



If we would determine what con- 

 clusion follows from the same osten- 

 sible premises when the tacit assump- 

 tion of real existence is left out, let 

 us, according to the recommendation 

 in a previous page, substitute means 

 for is. We then have — 



Dragon is a word meaning a thing 

 whicli breathes flame : 



Dragon is a word meaning a 

 serpent : 

 From which the conclusion is, 



Some word or icords which mean 

 a serpent, also mean a thing 

 which breathes flame : 

 where the conclusion (as well as the 

 premises) is true, and is the only kind 

 of conclusion which can ever follow 

 from a definition, namely, a proposi- 

 tion relating to the meaning of 

 words. 



There is still another shape into 

 which we may transform this syl- 

 logism. We may suppose the middle 

 term to be the designation neither of 

 a thing nor of a name, but of an idea. 

 We then have — 



The idea of a dragon is an idea of 

 a thing which breathes flame : 



The idea of a dragon is an idea of 

 a serpent : 



Therefore, there is an idea of a 

 serpent, which is an idea of a thing 

 breathing flame. 



Here the conclusion is true, and 

 also the premises ; but the premises 

 are not definitions. They are pro- 

 positions affirming that an idea exist- 

 ing in the mind includes certain ideal 

 elements. The truth of the conclu- 

 sion follows from the existence of the 

 psychological phenomenon called the 

 idea of a dragon ; and therefore still 



from the tacit assumption of a matter 

 of fact.* 



When, as in this last syllogism, the 

 conclusion is a proposition respecting 

 an idea, the assumption on which it 

 depends may be merely that of the 

 existence of an idea. But when the 

 conclusion is a proposition concerning 

 a Thing, the postulate involved in the 

 definition which stands as the appar- 

 ent premise is the existence of a thing 

 conformable to the definition, and not 

 merely of an idea conformable to it. 

 This assumption of real existence we 

 always convey the impression that we 

 intend to make when we profess to 



* In the only attempt which, so far as I 

 know, has been made to refute the preced- 

 ing argumentation, it is maintained that 

 in the first form of tlie syllogism, 



A dragon is a thing which breathes 

 flame, 



A dragon is a serpent, 



Therefore some serpent or serpecta 

 breathe flame, 

 " there is just as much truth in the con- 

 clusion as there is in the premises, or, 

 rather no more in the latter than in the 

 former. If the general name serpent in- 

 cludes both real and imaginary serpents, 

 there is no falsity in the conclusion ; if 

 not, there is falsity in the minor premise." 



Let us, then, try to set out the syllogism 

 on the hypothesis that the name serpent 

 includes imaginary serpents. We shall 

 find that it is now necessary to alter the 

 predicates : for it cann< )t be asserted that 

 an imaginary creature breathes flame ; in 

 predicating of it such a fact, we assert by 

 the most positive implication that it is 

 real and not imaginary. I'he conclusion 

 must run thus, "Some serpent or serpents 

 either do or are imagined to breathe flame." 

 And to prove this conclusion by the in- 

 stance of dragons, the premises must be, 

 A dragon is imagined as breattiing flame. 

 A dragon is a (real or imaginary) serpent : 

 from whicli it undoubtedly follows, that 

 there are serpents which are imagined to 

 breathe flame; but the major premise is 

 not a definition, nor part of a definition; 

 which is all that I am concerned to prove. 



Let us now examine the other assertion 

 — that if the word serpent stands for none 

 but real serpents, the minor premise (a 

 dragon is a serpent) is false. This is exactly 

 what I have myself said of the premise, 

 considered as a stat rnent of fact : but it 

 is not false as part of the definition of a 

 dragon ; and since the premises, or one of 

 them, must be false, (the coiiclu.sion b-'ing 

 so,) the real premise cannot be the defini- 

 tion, which is true, but the statement of 

 fact which is false. 



