oS 



NAMES AND PKOJi'OSlTIONS. 



support all the truths of geometry, 

 ?ince every property of a geometrical 

 line is really a property of all physical 

 objects in so far as possessing length. 

 But even what I hold to be the false 

 doctrine on the subject, leaves the 

 conclusion that our reasonings are 

 grounded on the matters of fact postu- 

 lated in definitions, and not on the de- 

 finitions themselves, entirely unaffect- 

 ed ; and accordingly this conclusion is 

 one which I have in common with Dr. 

 Whewell, in his Philosophy of the In- 

 ductive Sciences : though, on the nature 

 of demonstrative truth, Dr. Whewell's 

 opinions are greatly at variance with 

 mine. And here, as in many other 

 instances, I gladly acknowledge that 

 his writings are eminently serviceable 

 in clearing from confusion the initial 

 steps in the analysis of the mental 

 processes, even where his views re- 

 specting the ultimate analysis are such 

 as (though with unfeigned respect) I 

 cannot but regard as fundamentally 

 erroneous. 



§ 7. Although, according to the 

 opinion here presented, Definitions 

 are properly of names only, and not 

 of things, it does not follow from this 

 that definitions are arbitrary. How 

 to define a name, may not only be an 

 inquiry of considerable difficulty and 

 intricacy, but may involve considera- 

 tions going deep into the nature of 

 the things which are denoted by the 

 name. Such, for instance, are the 

 inquiries which form the subjects of 

 the most important of Plato's Dia- 

 logues ; as, " What is rhetoric ? " the 

 topic of the Gorgias, or "What is 

 justice ? " that of the Republic. Such, 

 also, is the question scornfully asked 

 by Pilate, « What is truth ? " and the 

 fundamental question with speculative 

 moralists in all ages, "What is vir- 

 tue ? " 



It would be a mistake to represent 

 these difficult and noble inquiries as 

 having nothing in view beyond ascer- 

 taining the conventional meaning of 

 a name. They are inquiries not so 

 mifch to determine what is, as what 



should be, the meaning of a name ; 

 which, like other practical questions 

 of terminology, requires for its solu- 

 tion that we should enter, and some- 

 times enter very deeply, into the pro- 

 perties not merely of names but of 

 the things named. 



Although the meaning of every 

 concrete general name resides in the 

 attributes which it connotes, the ob- 

 jects were named before the attri- 

 butes ; as appears from the fact that 

 in all languages, abstract names are 

 mostly compounds or other deriva- 

 tives of the concrete names which 

 correspond to them. Connotative 

 names, therefore, were, after proper 

 names, the first which were used : 

 and in the simpler cases, no doubt, a 

 distinct connotation was present to 

 the minds of those who first used the 

 name, and was distinctly intended by 

 them to be conveyed by it. The 

 first person who used the word white, 

 as applied to snow or to any other 

 object, knew, no doubt, very well what 

 quality he intended to predicate, and 

 had a perfectly distinct conception in 

 his mind of the attribute signified by 

 the name. 



But where the resemblances and 

 differences on which our classifications 

 are founded are not of this palpable 

 and easily determinable kind ; especi- 

 ally where they consist not in any 

 one quality but in a number of 

 qualities, the effects of which, being 

 blended together, are not very easily 

 discriminated, and referred each to 

 its true source ; it often happens that 

 names are applied to nameable objects, 

 with no distinct connotation present 

 to the minds of those who apply them. 

 They are only influenced by a general 

 resemblance between the new object 

 and all or some of the old familiar 

 objects which they have been accus- 

 tomed to call by that name. This, 

 as we have seen, is the law which 

 even the mind of the philosopher must 

 follow, in giving names to the simple 

 elementary feelings of our nature; 

 but, where the things to be named 

 are complex wholes, a philosopher is 



