BOOK 11. 



OF EEASONING. 



Ai(apia/jUvo}v 5c ro&rcjif Xiyuyfiep iiSri, Sid. rivwv, Kal irore, Kal ttws ylverai 

 Tras av\\oyL<TfJL6i' Darepov 5^ Xckt^ov irepl d7ro5et|ewj. UpSrepov ycip irepl 

 ffvWoyiiTfxov \€KT(iov, fj irepl dirodei^eus, 5ta t6 KadoXov /xdWou elval rdi' 

 crvWoytafidv. 'H fih ydp d7r65et|ts, avWoyuTfjids tis' 6 (TvWoyi(TiJL6s Si ov 

 Tof, dir656i^ts. Abist. Analyt. Prior. 1. i. cap. 4. 



CHAPTER I. 



OF INFERENCE, OR REASONING IN 

 GENERAL. 



§1. In the preceding Book we have 

 been occupied not with the nature of 

 Proof, but with the nature of Asser- 

 tion : the import conveyed by a Pro- 

 position, whether that Proposition be 

 true or false ; not the means by which 

 to discriminate true from false Pro- 

 positions. The proper subject, how- 

 ever, of Logic is Proof. Before we 

 could understand what Proof is, it 

 was necessary to understand what 

 that is to which proof is applicable ; 

 what that is which can be a subject 

 of belief or disbelief, of affirmation or 

 denial : what, in short, the different 

 kinds of Propositions assert. 



This preliminary inquiry we have 

 prosecuted to a definite result. Asser- 

 tion, in the first place, relates either 

 to the meaning of words, or to some 

 property of the things which words 

 signify. Assertions respecting the 

 meaning of words, among which de- 



I finitions are the roost important, hold 

 I a place, and an indispensable one, in 

 ' philosophy ; but as the meaning of 

 words is essentially arbitrary, this 

 class of assertions are not susceptible 

 of truth or falsity, nor therefore of 

 proof or disproof. Assertions respect- 

 ing Things, or what may be called 

 Real Propositions, in contradistinction 

 to verbal ones, are of various sorts. 

 We have analysed the import of each 

 sort, and have ascertained the nature 

 of the things they relate to, and the 

 nature of what they severally assert 

 respecting those • things. We found 

 that whatever be the form of the pro- 

 position, and whatever its nominal 

 subject or predicate, the real subject 

 of every proposition is some one or 

 more facts or phenomena of conscious- 

 ness, or some one or more of the 

 hidden causes or powers to which we 

 ascribe those facts ; and that what is 

 predicated or asserted, either in the 

 affirmative or negative, of those 

 phenomena or those powers, is always 

 either Existence, Order in Place, 



