io8 



REASONING. 



at least is, without doubt, a process 

 of real inference. The conclusion in 

 an induction embraces more than is 

 contained in the premises. The prin- 

 ciple or law collected from particular 

 instances, the general proposition in 

 which we embody the result of our 

 experience, covers a much larger ex- 

 tent of ground than the individual 

 experiments which form its basis, A 

 principle ascertained by experience is 

 more than a mere summing up of 

 what has been specifically observed 

 in the individual cases which have 

 been examined ; it is a generalisation 

 grounded on those cases, and expres- 

 sive of our belief that what we there 

 found true is true in an indefinite 

 number of cases which we have not 

 examined, and are never likely to 

 examine. The nature and grounds 

 of this inference, and the conditions 

 necessary to make it legitimate, will 

 be the subject of discussion in the 

 Third Book : but that such inference 

 really takes place is not susceptible of 

 question. In every induction we pro- 

 ceed from truths which we knew to 

 truths which we did not know ; from 

 facts certified by observation to facts 

 which we have not observed, and even 

 to facts not capable of being now ob- 

 served ; future facts, for example ; 

 but which we do not hesitate to be- 

 lieve on the sole evidence of the in- 

 duction itself. 



Induction, then, is a real process of 

 Reasoning or Inference. Whether, 

 and in what sense, as much can be 

 said of the Syllogism, remains to be 

 determined by the examination into 

 which we are about to enter. 



CHAPTER II. 



OP EATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM. 



§ I. The analysis of the Syllogism 

 has been so accurately and fully per- 

 formed in the common manuals of 

 Logic, that in the present work, which 

 is not designed as a manual, it is 

 sufficient to recapitulate, memories 



causd, the leading results of that 

 analysis, as a foundation for the re- 

 marks to be afterwards made on the 

 functions of the Syllogism, and the 

 place which it holds in science. 



To a legitimate syllogism it is 

 essential that there should be three, 

 and no more than three, propositions, 

 namely, the conclusion, or proposition 

 to be proved, and two other proposi- 

 tions which together prove it, and 

 which are called the premises. It is 

 essential that there should be three, 

 and no more than three, terms, 

 namely, the subject and predicate of 

 the conclusion, and another called the 

 middle term, which must be found in 

 both premises, since it is by means of 

 it that the other two terms are to be 

 connected together. The predicate of 

 the conclusion is called the major 

 term of the syllogism ; the subject of 

 the conclusion is called the minor 

 term. As there can be but three 

 terms, the major and minor terms 

 must each be found in one, and only 

 one of the premises, together with 

 the middle term which is in them 

 both. The premise which contains the 

 middle term and the m a jor term is called 

 the major premise ; that which con- 

 tains the middle term and the minor 

 term is called the minor premise. 



Syllogisms are divided by some 

 logicians into three figures, by others 

 into four, according to the position of 

 the middle term, which may either be 

 the subject in both premises, the pre- 

 dicate in both, or the subject in one 

 and the predicate in the other. The 

 most common case is that in which 

 the middle term is the subject of the 

 major premise and the predicate of 

 the minor. This is reckoned as the 

 first figure. When the middle term 

 is the predicate in both premises, the 

 syllogism belongs to the second figure ; 

 when it is the subject in both, to the 

 third. In the fourth figure the mid- 

 dle term is the subject of the minor 

 premise and the predicate of the 

 major. Those writers who reckon no 

 more than three figures include this 

 case in the first. 



