ii8 



REASONING. 



one into the other of the two lan- 

 guages in which we formerly re- 

 marked * that all propositions, and of 

 course therefore all combinations of 

 propositions, might be expressed. We 

 observed that a proposition might be 

 considered in two different lights ; 



meaning if man connoted one thing when 

 predicated of John, and another though 

 closely resembling thing wnen predicated 

 of William. Accordingly a recent pamphlet 

 asserts the impossibility of general know- 

 ledge on this precise ground 



The meaning of any general name is some 

 outward or inward phenomenon, consist- 

 ing, in the last resort, of feelings ; and 

 these feelings, if their continuity is for an 

 instant broken, are no longer the same 

 feelings, in the sense of individual identity 

 What, then, is the common something 

 which gives a meaning to the general 

 name ? Mr. Spencer can only say. it is the 

 similarity of the feelings : and I rejom, 

 the attribute is precisely that similarity. 

 The names of attributes are in their idti- 

 mate analysis names for the resemblances 

 of our sensations (or other feelings). Every 

 general name, whether abstractor concrete, 

 denotes or connotes one or more of those 

 resemblances. It will not. probably, be 

 denied, that if a hundred -ensations are un- 

 distinguishably alike, their resemblance 

 ought to be spoken of as one resemblance, 

 and not a hundred resemblances which 

 merely resemble one another. The tlnnga 

 compared are many, but the something 

 common to all of them must be conceived 

 as one, just as the name is conceived a8 

 one, though coiresponding to numerically 

 different sensations ot sound each time it 

 is pronounced. The general term man 

 does not connote the sensations derived 

 once fron^ one man, wnich, once gone, can 

 no more occur again than the same flash 

 of ligiirning. It counotes tlie general type 

 of the sensations derived from all men, 

 and I he power (always thought of as one) 

 of producing sensations of that type. And 

 the axiom mitjht be tiius worded : Two 

 types of sensation, each of which co-exists 

 with a third type, co-exist with another ; 

 or, Two poicers, each of wnich co-exists with 

 a third power, co-exist with one another. 



Mr. Spencer has misunderstood me in 

 another particular. He supposes that the 

 co-existence spoken of in the axiom, of two 

 things wirh the same third tiling, means 

 Bimultaneousness in time. 'I'he co-exis- 

 tence me int is that of being jointly attri- 

 butes of the same subject. The attribute 

 of beins: born without teeth, and the attri- 

 bute of having thirty-two teeth in mature 

 age, are in tiiis sense co-existent, both being 

 attributes of man, though ex vi termini 

 never of the same man at the same time. 



* Supra, p. 75. . 



as a portion of our knowledge of 

 nature, or as a memorandum for our 

 guidance. Under the former, or 

 speculative aspect, an affirmative 

 general proposition is an i<ssertion of 

 a speculative truth, viz. that whatever 

 has a certain attribute has a certain 

 other attribute. Under the other 

 aspect, it is to be regarded not as a 

 part of our knowledge, but as an aid 

 for our practical exigencies, by en- 

 abling us, when we see or learn that 

 an object possesses one of the two 

 attributes, to infer that it possesses 

 the other ; thus employing the first 

 attribute as a mark or evidence of the 

 second. Thus regarded, every s^'llo- 

 gism comes within the following gen- 

 eral formula : — 



Attribute A is a mark of attribute B, 

 The given object has the mark A, 



therefore 

 The given object has the attribute B. 

 Referred to this type, the argu- 

 ments which we have lately cited as 

 specimens of the syllogism will ex- 

 press themselves in the following 

 manner : — 

 The attributes of man are a mark of 



the attribute mortality, 

 Socrates has the attributes of man, 



therefore 

 Socrates has the attribute mortality. 



And again, 

 The attributes of man are a mark of 



the attribute mortality. 

 The attributes of a king are a mark of 

 the attributes of man, 

 therefore 

 The attributes of a king are a mark of 

 the attribute mortality. 

 And, lastly. 

 The attributes of man are a mark of 

 the absence of the attribute omni- 

 potence. 

 The attributes of a king are a mark of 

 the attributes of man, 

 therefore 

 The attributes of a king are a mark 

 of the absence of the attribute 

 signified by the word omnipotent 

 (or, are evidence of the absence of 

 that attribute). 

 To correspond with this alteration 



