FUNCTIONS AND VALtTE OF THE SYLLOGISM, 121 



or in any of those which we previously 

 constructed, is it not evident that the 

 conclusion may, to the person to whom 

 the syllogism is presented, be actually 

 and bond fide a new truth ? Is it not 

 matter of daily experience that truths 

 previously unthought of, facts which 

 have not been, and cannot be, directly 

 observed, are arrived at by way of 

 general reasoning ? We believe that 

 the Duke of Wellington is mortal. 

 We do not know this by direct observa- 

 tion, so long as he is not yet dead. 

 If we were asked how, this being the 

 case, we know the Duke to be mortal, 

 we should probably answer, Because 

 all men are so. Here, therefore, we 

 arrive at the knowledge of a truth not 

 (as yet) susceptible of observation, by 

 a reasoning which admits of being 

 exhibited in the following syllogism: — 

 All men are mortal, 



The Duke of Wellington is a man, 

 therefore 



The Duke of Wellington is mortal. 

 And since a large portion of our 

 knowledge is thus acquired, logicians j 

 have persisted in representing the 

 syllogism as a process of inference or 

 proof, though none of them has cleared 

 up the difficulty which arises from the 

 inconsistency between that assertion 

 and the principle that if there be 

 anything in the conclusion which was 

 not already asserted in the premises, 

 the argument is vicious. For it is 

 impossible to attach any serious scien- 

 tific value to such a mere salvo as the 

 distinction drawn between being in- 

 volved hy implication in the premises, 

 and being directly asserted in them. 

 When Archbishop Whately says* that 

 the object of reasoning is " merely to 

 expand and unfold the assertions 

 wrapt up, as it were, and implied in 

 those with which we set out, and to 

 bring a person to perceive and acknow- 

 ledge the full force of that which he 

 has admitted." he does not, I think, 

 meet the real difficulty requiring to 

 be explained, namely, how it happens 

 that a science, like geometry, can be 



* Logic, p. 239 (gth ed.) 



all " wrapt up " in a few definitions 

 and axioms. Nor does this defence 

 of the syllogism differ much from 

 what its assailants urge against it as 

 an accusation, when they charge it 

 with being of no use except to those 

 who seek to press the consequences of 

 an admission into which a person has 

 been entrapped without having con- 

 sidered and understood its full force. 

 When you admitted the major pre- 

 mise, you asserted the conclusion ; 

 but, says Archbit>hop Whately, you 

 asserted it by implication merely : 

 this, however, can here only mean 

 that you asserted it unconsciously ; 

 that you did not know you were 

 asserting it ; but, if so, the difficulty 

 revives in this shape — Ought you not 

 to have known ? Were you warranted 

 in asserting the general proposition 

 without having satisfied yourself of 

 the truth of everything which it fairly 

 includes ? And if not, is not the 

 syllogistic art primd facie what its 

 assailants affirm it to be, a contrivance 

 for catching you in a trap, and hold- 

 ing you fast in it ? * 



§ 3. From this difficulty there ap- 

 pears to be but one issue. The pro- 

 position that the Duke of Wellington 

 is mortal, is evidently an inference ; 



* It is hardly necessary to say, that I 

 am not contending for any such absurdity 

 as that we actually " ought to iiave known " 

 and considered the case of every individual 

 man, past, present, and future, before 

 affirming that all men are mortal : although 

 this interpretation has been, strangely 

 enough, put upon the preceding obsei-va- 

 tions. There is no difference between me 

 and Archbisliop Whately, or any other 

 defender of the syllogism, on the practical 

 part of the matter ; I am only pointing out 

 an inconsistency in the logical theory of 

 it, as conceived by almost all writers. I 

 do not say that a person who affirmed, 

 before the Duke of Wellington was born, 

 that all men are mortal, kneie that the 

 Duke of Wellington was moi-tal ; but I do 

 say that he asserted it : and I ask for an 

 explanation of the apparent logical fallacy 

 of adducing in proof of the Duke of Wel- 

 lington's mortality a general statement 

 which presupposes it. Finding no suf- 

 ficient resolution of this difficulty in any 

 of the writers on Logic, I have attempted 

 to supply one. 



