FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 127 



gotten ; but a record remains, not 

 indeed descriptive of the f;icts them- 

 ■elves, but showing how those cases 

 may be distinguished, respecting 

 which, the facts, when known, were 

 considered to warrant a given infer- 

 ence. According to the indications 

 of this record we draw our conclusion ; 

 which is, to all intents and purposes, 

 a conclusion from the forgotten facts. 

 For this it is essential that we should 

 read the record correctly ; and the 

 rules of the syllogism are a set of pre- 

 cautions to ensure our doing so. 



This view of the functions of the 

 syllogism is confirmed by the con- 

 sideration of precisely those cases which 

 might be expected to be least favour- 

 able to it, namely, those in which 

 ratiocination is independent of any 

 previous induction. We have already 

 observed that the syllogism, in the 

 ordinary course of our reasoning, is 

 only the latter half of the process of 

 travelling from premises to a conclu- 

 sion. There are, however, some pecu- 

 liar cases in which it is the whole 

 process. Particulars alone are cap- 

 able of being subjected to observation ; 

 and all knowledge which is derived 

 from observation begins, therefore, 

 of necessity, in particulars ; but our 

 knowledge may, in cases of certain 

 descriptions, be conceived as coming 

 to us from other sources than observa- 

 tion. It may present itself as coming 

 from testimony, which, on the occa- 

 sion and for the purpose in hand, is 

 accepted as of an authoritative char- 

 acter : and the information thus 

 communicated may be conceived to 

 comprise not only particular facts but 

 general propositions, as when a 

 scientific doctrine is accepted without 

 examination on the authority of 

 writers, or a theological doctrine on 

 that of Scripture. Or the generalisa- 

 tion may not be, in the ordinary sense, 

 an assertion at all, but a command ; a 

 law, not in the philosophical, but in 

 the moral and political sense of the 

 term : an expression of the desire of a 

 superior, that we, or any number of 

 otb«r personB, ehail conform our con- 



duct to certain general instructions. 

 So far as this asserts a fact, namely, a 

 volition of the legislator, that fact is 

 ail individual fact, and the proposition, 

 therefore, is not a general proposition. 

 But the description therein contained 

 of the conduct which it is the will of 

 the legislator that his subject should 

 observe, is general. The proposition 

 asserts, not that all men are anything, 

 but that all men shall do sometliing. 



In both these cases the generalities 

 are the original data, and the parti- 

 culars are elicited from them by a 

 process which correctly resolves itself 

 into a series of syllogisms. The real 

 nature, however, of the supposed de- 

 ductive process is evident enough. 

 The only point to be determined is, 

 whether the authority which declared 

 the general proposition intended to 

 include this case in it ; and whether 

 the legislator intended his command 

 to apply to the present case among 

 others or not ? This is ascertained by 

 examining whether the case possesses 

 the marks by which, as those autho- 

 rities have signified, the cases which 

 they meant to certify or to influence 

 may be known. The object of the in- 

 quiry is to make out the witness's or 

 the legislator's intention, through the 

 indication given by their words. This 

 is a question, as the Germans express 

 it, of hermeneutics. The operation is 

 not a process of inference, but a process 

 of interpretation. 



In this last phrase we have obtained 

 an expression which appears to me to 

 characterise, moreaptly than any other, 

 the functions of the syllogism in all 

 cases. When the premises are given 

 by authority, the function of Reason- 

 ing is to ascertain the testimony of a 

 witness, or the will of a legislator, by 

 interpreting the signs in which the 

 one has intimated his assertion and 

 the other his command. In like man- 

 ner, when the premises are derived 

 from observation, the function of 

 Reasoning is to ascertain what we 

 (or our predecessors) formerly thoujrht 

 might be inferred from the observed 

 facte, and to do this by interpreting 



