FUNCTIONS AND VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 



133 



propositions expressive of the series of 

 observations of which the generalisa- 

 tion called the major premise is the 

 result. 



In the argument, then, which proves 

 that Socrates is mortal, one indispen- 

 sable part of the premises will be as 

 follows : " My father, and my father's 

 father. A, B, C, and an indefinite num- 

 ber of other persons, were mortal : " 

 which is only an expression in diffe- 

 rent words of the observed fact that 

 they have died. This is the major 

 premise divested of the petitio prin- 

 cipii, and cut down to as much as is 

 really known by direct evidence. 



In order to connect this proposition 

 with the conclusion Socrates is mortal, 

 the additional link necessary is such 

 a proposition as the following : " So- 

 crates resembles my father, and my 

 father's father, and the other indi- 

 viduals specified." This proposition 

 we assert when we say that Socrates 

 is a man. By saying so we likewise 

 assert in what respect he resembles 

 them, namely, in the attributes con- 

 noted by the word man. And we 

 conclude that he further resembles 

 them in the attribute mortality. 



§ 7. We have thus obtained what 

 we were seeking, an universal type of 

 the reasoning process. We find it re- 

 solvable in all cases into the following 

 elements : Certain individuals have a 

 given attribute ; an individual or in- 

 dividuals resemble the former in cer- 

 tain other attributes ; therefore they 

 resemble them also in the given attri- 

 bute. This type of ratiocination does 

 not claim, like the syllogism, to be 

 conclusive from the mere form of the 

 expression ; nor can it possibly be so. 

 That one proposition does or does not 

 assert the very fact which was already 

 asserted in another, may appear from 

 the form of the expression, that is, 

 from a comparison of the language ; 

 but when the two propositions assert 

 facts which are bond fide different, 

 whether the one fact proves the other 

 or not can never appear from the lan- 

 guage, but must depend on other con- 



siderations. Whether, from the attri- 

 butes in which Socrates resembles 

 those men who have heretofore died, 

 it is allowable to infer that he re- 

 sembles them also in being mortal, is 

 a question of Induction ; and is to be 

 decided by the principles or canons 

 which we shall hereafter recognise as 

 tests of the correct performance of 

 that great mental operation. 



Meanwhile, however, it is certain, 

 as before remarked, that if this infer- 

 ence can be drawn as to Socrates, it 

 can be drawn as to all others who 

 resemble the observed individuals in 

 the same attributes in which he re- 

 sembles them ; that is (to express the 

 thing concisely) of all mankind. If, 

 therefore, the argument be admissible 

 in the case of Socrates, we are at 

 liberty, once for all, to treat the pos- 

 session of the attributes of man as a 

 mark, or satisfactory evidence, of the 

 attribute of mortality. This we do 

 by laying down the universal proposi- 

 tion. All men are mortal, and inter- 

 preting this, as occasion arises, in its 

 application to Socrates and others. 

 By this means we establish a very 

 convenient division of the entire 

 logical operation into two steps ; first, 

 that of ascertaining what attributes 

 are marks of mortality ; and, secondly, 

 whether any given individuals possess 

 those marks. And it will generally 

 be advisable, in our speculations on 

 the reasoning process, to consider this 

 double operation as in fact taking 

 place, and all reasoning as carried on 

 in the form into which it must neces- 

 sarily be thrown to enable us to apply 

 to it any test of its correct perform- 

 ance. 



Although, therefore, all processes 

 of thought in which the ultimate pre- 

 mises are particulars, whether we con- 

 clude from particulars to a general 

 formula, or from particulars to other 

 particulars according to that formula, 

 are equally Induction ; we shall yet, 

 conformably to usage, consider the 

 name Induction as more peculiarly 

 belonging to the process of establish- 

 ing the general proposition, and the 



